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Four major political and legal institutions are simultaneously affecting the communications regulatory environment of the 1980's:
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the courts. The FCC recently concluded in its Computer Inquiry II1 that all enhanced services and
most interstate customer premises equipment (CPE) should be
detariffed. Also, dominant carriers will be permitted to offer enhanced services and CPE only through a totally separate, unregulated subsidiary. 2 Congress nearly enacted the Communications Act
Amendments of 1980 which would have required dominant concerns
to offer enhanced services and CPE through a separate subsidiary,
as well as effecting several other changes in the communications3
regulatory environment. Congress is continuing to study this area.
The third, and at present the most important, factor in the communications industry relates to the United States v. AT&T antitrust set1. This refers to an examination of the communications industry begun by the
FCC in 1976. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. See also Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the FCC's Rules and Regulations, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980), modified on
recon. 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),further recon. 86 F.C.C. 512 (1981), appeal pending sub
nom. CCIA v. FCC, No. 80-1471 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
2. See G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDusTRY (1981). See generally
Trebing, Common Carrier Regulation-The Silent Crisis, 34 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.
299 (1969) (contains an excellent and concise legal history of telecommunications in
the United States).
3. S. 2827, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1980).
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tlement.4 The parties have agreed on a divestiture plan in which the
twenty-two Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) will be divested into
seven separate companies, with AT&T retaining Bell Labs, Long
Lines, Bell Headquarters, and Western Electric.5 The legal structure of the communications regulatory environment in the 1980's
will remain in a state of flux while the structure and role of the parent AT&T and the BOCs are refined within these four legal areas.
This Article presents a brief discussion of the history of the 1934
Communications Act followed by analyses of the FCC's Computer
Inquiry 16 and Computer Inquiry II. The congressional response to
the changing communications technology will then be briefly examined. Finally, the interrelationship between the FCC decisions
and the United States v. AT&T settlement 7 will be analyzed, followed by a general discussion of future trends in the communications industry based on the emerging legal environment.
I.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

THE 1934 COMMUNICATIONS ACT

The Federal Communications Act of 19348 established the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and empowered this regulatory agency with both rulemaking and adjudicatory authority.
Under the 1934 Act, Congress outlined the basic rules for governing
4. 47 Fed. Reg. 4166 (1982). See infra notes 186-257 and accompanying text.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
7. See supra note 4.
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 151 explains that the FCC
was created "[f ] or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges .... "
See Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation of Functions and the Role of
the Federal CommunicationsCommission, 27 FED. COM. L.J. 161 (1974); Davison, Babcock & Lesley, Computers and Federal Regulation, 21 AD. L. REV. 287 (1969).
The Supreme Court has recognized the FCC's broad authority. See United States
v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-69 (1968). The FCC had requested legislation to regulate the Community Antenna Television System (CATV), but no legislation was enacted. The legislators responded to the FCC's request by saying that the
determination of jurisdiction was left to the courts. The FCC gradually exercised jurisdiction and subsequently issued revised rules for regulating CATV. The Court
held that "the authority which we recognize today under § 152(a) is restricted to that
reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." Quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(4), the
Court further held that the FCC has the authority "to issue such orders as necessity
requires." 392 U.S. at 178.
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interstate and foreign wire and radio communications. 9 Interstate
telephone service was established as a nationally regulated monopoly, but intrastate telephone operations remained subject to regulation by state public utilities commissions. Telephone companies
were declared to be communications common carriers; these are
firms which are regulated and which provide communications services to the public pursuant to a tariff.10 Tariffs, or rates, are established through a procedure in which a regulated common carrier
requests approval of its tariff proposals. The appropriate regulatory
authority approves a tariff which affords the common carrier an opportunity to achieve a fair rate of return on its invested capital. This
process provides a substitute for market forces which, in theory, regulate a competitive industry composed of many firms offering and
buying the same or similar goods or services.
B.

THE 1956 WESTERN ELECTRIC CONSENT DECREE

Before examining the cases leading up to Computer Inquiry I
and Computer Inquiry 11,11 an overriding, salient fact should be
noted. Under the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree,12 the Bell
System was prohibited from offering, even through a separate subsidiary, any device that possessed the capability to perform a data
processing function. The Bell System was also foreclosed from any
9. 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1976). Section 153(a) provides that:
"wire communication" or "communication by wire" means the "transmission
of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the points of origin and reception of
such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and
services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission."
Id.

Section 153(b) similarly defines radio communications as "transmission by radio
or writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding,
and delivery of communication) incidental to such transmission."
10. See 74 Am. JuR. 2d Telecommunications §§ 4-6 (1974); 86 C.J.S. TeL & Tel. Ra-

dio & Television §§ 5-7 (1954).
11. Computer Inquiries I and 11 will be discussed in text accompanying infra
notes 34-47.
12. The defendants were each:
enjoined and restrained from commencing, and after three (3) years from the
data of this Final Judgment from continuing, directly or indirectly, to manufacture for sale or lease any equipment which is of a type not sold or leased
or intended to be sold or leased to Companies of the Bell System, for use in
furnishing common carrier communications services, except equipment used
in the manufacture or installation of equipment which is of a type so sold or
leased or intended to be sold or leased ....
1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246.
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direct or indirect activity in an unregulated market.' 3 One interesting point is that the FCC, in establishing the legal distinction between data processing and communications, was in effect defining
the limits of the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree. Thus, by indirect action, the FCC delineated the boundaries of the communications industry within which the Bell System could operate. If the
FCC classified a data processing service or product as a communications service or product, then AT&T was able to offer the service or
product under tariff. Consequently, the objective of the 1956 Western
Electric Consent Decree, which was to prohibit AT&T from entering
4
the data processing industry, was thwarted.'

C.

EARLY CASES

In 1956, the distinction between communications and data
processing was relatively well-defined. But because of advances in
communications and computer technologies made after 1956, the
distinction between communications and data processing has
changed.' 5 Until these technological advances were made, AT&T offered end-to-end communication service. These technological developments gave rise to numerous cases involving the interaction of
communications and computers in which the Bell System end-toend service was challenged.
1. The Hush-a-Phone Decision
Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States'6 tested the legality of the
tariff prohibiting all foreign attachments to the phone system.
Hush-a-Phone manufactured and sold a device that when attached
over the speaker of a telephone enabled the person speaking into
the phone not to be overheard by third parties near the speaker. After the sale of numerous devices, various telephone companies
threatened to suspend or terminate service to subscribers who con13. Under the 1956 Consent Decree, AT&T was "enjoined and restrained from engaging, either directly, or indirectly through its subsidiaries other than Western and
Western's subsidiaries, in any business other than the furnishings of common carrier
communications services. . . ." Id.
14. See AT&T's Access to New Markets Backed by Court, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1981,
at 1. See also Judge Widens AT&T Business Scope, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 1981, at C-7.
Judge Vincent P. Biunno of the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey ruled September 4, 1981, that the FCC's 1980 Ruling on Competition and the
1956 Consent Decree did not conflict. Judge Biunno, ruling on the March 1980, request
of AT&T that he interpret the 1956 Consent Decree, held that enhanced services could
be offered by AT&T because it is a communications service.
15. See Bylinsky, The Second Computer Revolution, FORTUNE, Feb. 11, 1980, at 23032; The Computer Society, A Special Section, TIME, Feb. 20, 1978.
16. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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tinued to use Hush-a-Phone based on the FCC tariff prohibiting foreign attachments. The FCC had concluded that the use of devices
such as Hush-a-Phone was "deleterious to the telephone system"
and would result in a general degradation of quality service.' 7 On
appeal, the decision was reversed and remanded to the FCC. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that the tariff
was "unwarranted interference with the telephone subscriber's right
reasonably to use his telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being publicly detrimental."'18 On remand, the FCC invalidated the tariff prohibiting foreign attachments, but only as the
related to Hush-a-Phones.
2. The Carterphone Decision
Another early case involved the Carterphone Corporation's production and sale of a radio transmitter that would automatically
switch on when the user was speaking and then would return the
radio to receiving status when the speaker was finished. By connecting this device to the telephone system, a user was able to call
any point on the telephone system from a remote radio.19 After the
sale of several thousand of these devices, common carriers claimed
that the use of Carterphones on the telephone network was prohibited under the tariff prohibiting foreign attachments. Carterphone
Corporation filed a private antitrust suit against the telephone companies to invalidate the tariff on antitrust grounds.20 The court
ruled that the FCC had primary jurisdiction and therefore referred
the case to the FCC. 2 1 The FCC's hearing examiner approved the
Carterphone radio transmitter for use on the telephone network,
and he ordered the carriers to change their tariffs to allow the use of
the Carterphone device. 22 On appeal the FCC, without a hearing, affirmed the decision of its hearing examiner and broadened the hearing examiner's decision to include all harmless attachments
provided by customers. 23 The Bell and General Telephone (GTE)
systems appealed the FCC's decision, but the appeal was later with17. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 20 F.C.C. 391, 420 (1955).
18. Hush-a-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See
Smith, Storming the AT&T Fortress: Can the FCC Deregulate Competitive Common
CarrierServices?, 32 FED. COM. LJ. 205, 221 (1980).
19. There was no electrical connection between the AT&T equipment and the
Carterphone.
20. Carter v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex.), affd, 365 F.2d
486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1966).
21. Id. at 189.
22. Use of the Carterphone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13
F.C.C.2d 430 (1967) recon. denied, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968).
23. Id.
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24
drawn when the parties settled out of court.
After World War H1, microwave communications grew slowly,
and the FCC generally assigned frequencies to common carriers and
to government agencies. By the 1950's, numerous corporations were
25
In
applying for licenses to operate their own microwave systems.
1957, the FCC consolidated all the applications, and over the objection of common carriers changed its "no entry" policy to allow private firms entry into the microwave field. 26 Each applicant was
assigned a portion of the radio spectrum above 890 millicycles. The
private applicants, however, were not allowed to share facilities or
use of a microwave system among themselves. If permitted to share
facilities or use of a microwave system, groups of applicants (each
not needing the entire capacity) could have combined together to
provide themselves with a total microwave system. This combined
microwave system would have been a major unregulated carrier in
competition with the existing regulated common carriers. Even
without the ability to combine and share a microwave communications system, however, each individual applicant posed an economic
threat to the existing carriers. Consequently, those regulated common carriers reacted defensively to protect their shares of the communication revenues by applying for 27new service offerings with
drastically reduced long distance rates.

3. The MCI Dispute
In 1964, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) applied to the
FCC for permission to provide low cost voice and data communications links between urban centers. Substantial price reductions, as
compared to the common carriers' rates, were proposed. Consumers
would also have been granted complete flexibility in using the terminal equipment on an unqualified sharing of lines. Thus, a consumer needing only a portion of the MCI offering could purchase the
service and resell what was not needed. In many instances, this
sharing of lines would afford each customer substantial savings over
AT&T's costs for similar lines on a nonshared basis. The FCC's
hearing examiner approved a limited MCI application connecting
24. See Walker, Mathison & Jones, Data Transmission and the Foreign Attachment Rule, 16 DATAMATION, Feb. 1969, at 60.
25. See G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 180-87, 198-210 (1981).
26. Allocation of Frequencies In the Bands Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), recon. denied 29 F.C.C. 825 (1959).
27. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 37 F.C.C. 1111 (1964), affd sub nom. American
Trucking Assn. v. FCC, 377 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967).
See also Note, Regulation of Computer Communications, 7 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 208
(1970).
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Chicago and St. Louis. In affirming the hearing examiner, the Comby MCI would meet a sigmission stated that the proposed service
28
nificant unfilled communications need.
After the initial MCI application was granted, other applicants
petitioned the FCC for construction of commercial microwave systems. After realizing that it was faced with a general licensing ques29
tion, the FCC in 1970 grouped together several of the applications.
Over the objections of the regulated common carriers, in 1970, the
30
FCC established a policy of approving individual applications.
Subsequently, the FCC approved the application of numerous companies wanting to offer commercial microwave services. 3' In a defensive response, the existing communications common carriers
announced plans to construct nationwide digital data networks.
4. The Bunker-Ramo Dispute
While the MCI dispute was in progress, a dispute arose between
Bunker-Ramo Corporation (an unregulated firm) and AT&T,
Bunker-Ramo had previously provided a national stock quotation
service on lines leased from AT&T. But in 1965, Bunker-Ramo included a buy-sell provision in its service offering so that brokers using the stock quotation service could also transact business. AT&T
contended that the additional service proposed by Bunker-Ramo
was within its traditional communications monopoly. Consequently,
Bunker-Ramo was denied access to the necessary communications
lines. Bunker-Ramo finally withdrew its "message-offering" petition.
Then in 1967, Western Union, which was substantially regulated by
the FCC, filed a tariff which would provide the same service that
Bunker-Ramo had requested to provide. The Western Union tariff
28. Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), recon. denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970).
29. Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point
Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43 and 61 of the
Commission's Rules, 24 F.C.C.2d 318 (1970).
30. Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point
Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43 and 61 of the
Commission's Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 670 (1971), a~fd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp.
Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub. nom. National Ass'n of
Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 423 U.S. 836 (1975). See Smith, Storming the FCC
Fortress: Can the FCC Deregulate Competitive Common Carrier Services?, 32 FED.
Comm. L.J. 205, 223 (1980).
31. Comment, Federal Communications Regulation of Domestic Computer Communications: A Competitive Reformation, 22 BtuFAw L. REV. 947 (1973).
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32
was approved over the objection of Bunker-Ramo.
These early cases penetrated AT&T's end-to-end service monopoly. The FCC had allowed Hush-a-Phone to enter the limited
mechanical phone attachments market, Carterphone to connect (although non-electrically) with the phone system, and MCI to establish voice and digital communications service between major cities.
Thus, even though the FCC had not permitted Bunker-Ramo to establish a message-switching service in addition to its stock-quotation service, a major shift in FCC regulatory philosophy had
occurred. 33 Based on this new FCC policy of free entry, both regulated communications common carriers and some nonregulated
communications carriers were permitted to compete for parts of the
communications traffic which had previously been in the exclusive
domain of AT&T in its end-to-end communications service offerings.

II.

COMPUTER INQUIRY I

Against this backdrop of rulings, the FCC determined that a full
examination of the computer and communications interface was
needed. In 1966, the FCC initiated an Inquiry (hereinafter Computer
Inquiry I) designed to answer the following two questions:
1. Under what circumstances should data processing, computer
information, message switching, or any particular combination
thereof, be deemed subject to regulation pursuant to the provisions
of the Communications Act?
2. Would the policies and objectives of the Communications
Act be served better by such regulations or by such services evolving in a free, competitive market; and, if the latter, would changes in
34
existing provisions of the law or regulations be needed?

A. THE FCC's

FINAL DECISION

The FCC received over 3,000 pages of correspondence and submitted these responses to the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) for
analysis. 35 In its Final Decision, the FCC made three major rulings:
32. Western Union Tel. Co., 11 F.C.C.2d 1 (1967).
33. See Comment, Computer Services and the Federal Regulation of Communications, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 328 (1967). See also Smith, Interdependence of Computer and
Communications Services and Facilities:A Question of Federal Regulation, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 829 (1969).

34. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications Services and Facilities, 7 F.C.C.2d 11, 17 (1966) (Notice of
Inquiry). An additional issue relating to privacy was originally raised, but it was later
dismissed as being beyond the jurisdiction of the FCC.
35. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Coin-
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(1) it retained broad jurisdiction over those aspects of the comphter
industry relating to communications; (2) it decided that common
carriers could not favor their own affiliates if they chose to enter the
data processing industry; and (3) it established the principle of maximum separation so that the data processing affiliates were to be to36
tally separated from their parent common carriers.
In deciding to regulate the communications aspects of the data
processing industry, and thereby limit AT&T to communications offerings only, the FCC was forced to define the difference between
data processing and message switching. "Data processing" was defined as:
the use of a computer for the processing of information as distinguished from circuit or message-switching. "Processing" involves
the use of the computer for operations which include, inter alia, the
functions of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging, and calculating
data, according to programmed instructions." 37 "Message switching" was defined as follows: "the computer-controlled transmission
of messages, between two or more points, via communications'38facilities, wherein the content of the message remains unaltered.
The FCC further refined the difference between message
switching and data processing by defining "hybrid data processing
service" and "hybrid communications service." These two categories were defined as follows: "(i) Hybrid Data Processing Service is
a hybrid service offering wherein the message-switching capability
is incidental to the data processing function or purpose;" and
"(ii) Hybrid Communications Service is a hybrid service offering
wherein the data processing capability is incidental to the messageswitching function or purpose." 39 The overall effect of the data
processing definition was that firms whose primary thrust was data
processing would not be regulated. The FCC assumed that communications common carriers would police the4 ° line between hybrid
data processing and hybrid communications.
municationsServices, 34 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 369 (1969); Dunn, the FCC Computer
Inquiry, 15 DATAMATION, Oct. 1969, at 71.
36. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (Tentative
Decision); 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (Final Decision), recon. denied, 34 F.C.C.2d 557
(1972). See B. GILCHRIST & M. WESSEL, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF THE COMPUTER
INDUSTRY 70 (1972); Note, The FCC Computer Inquiry: Interface of Competitive and

Regulated Markets, 71 MICH. L. REV. 172 (1972).
37. 28 F.C.C.2d at 287; 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(1) (1973).
38. Id.§ 64.702(a)(2).
39. Id.§ 64.702(a)(5).
40. 28 F.C.C.2d at 274. See Berman, Computer or Communications? Allocation of
Functions and the Rule of the Federal Communications Commission, 27 FED. COM.
LJ. 161 (1974).
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B. GTE SERVICE v. FCC
After exhausting administrative procedures, the communications common carriers appealed the FCC's decision in Computer Inquiry I. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC4 1 affirmed the authority of the
FCC to regulate communications common carriers who entered the
data processing field, but held that the FCC could not regulate data
processors who merely used communications networks. Furthermore, the court upheld the FCC's requirement that communications
common carriers entering the data processing industry establish a
totally separate data processing subsidiary. 42 However, the attempt
by the FCC to prohibit the separate subsidiary from using the parent company's name was invalidated. Consequently, the separate
subsidiary could obtain the goodwill benefits of its parent's name.
Also, carriers were permitted to purchase data processing services
from their separate subsidiaries.
C.

POST

COMPUTER INQUIRY I DEVELOPMENTS

In the 1960's and 1970's, communications and computer technologies advanced even more rapidly. 43 The data communications
equipment section has been at the forefront of this technological advancement, and data communications technology has attained a
high degree of specialization. Front-end computers dedicated solely
to communications functions act as buffers between powerful mainframes and intelligent communications networks and perform many
sophisticated functions including line control, character and
message switching and handling, conversion of data and protocols,
error control, message editing, and message queuing. 44 Computer
mainframes, relieved of these communications functions, can specialize on various data processing functions. Given these technological developments, the legal distinction between data processing and
message switching which the FCC had carefully established in Com'45
puter Inquiry I became "technologically outdated.
41. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973), decision on remand, 40
F.C.C.2d 293 (1973).
42. Note, Federal Communications Commission-Review of Regulations Relating
to Provisions of Data Procession Services by Communications Common CarriersGTE Service Corp. v. FCC, 15 B.C. INDuS. & COM. L. REV. 162 (1973).
43. See generally Frank, Alive and Well, 26 DATAMATION, June 1980, at 112.
44. Id. at 112, 114.
45. See Wiley, Competition in Telecommunications, 47 ANTrrRUST U.J. 1283, 1285
(1979).
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III. COMPUTER INQUIRY II

Based on these technological developments and the realization
that the demarcation points between data processing, hybrid categories, and communications defined in Computer Inquiry I were no
longer technically valid, the FCC initiated Computer Inquiry II.4 In
Computer Inquiry II, the FCC asked the industry for comments and
47
new definitions dealing with data processing functions.
A.

DATA-SPEED

40/4

CONTROVERSY

As the FCC initiated Computer Inquiry II, AT&T announced it
would offer the Data-Speed 40/4 communications terminal as a tariffed communications item. However, many terminal manufacturers
believed that the Data-Speed 40/4 was a "smart" data processing
terminal, and pursuant to Computer Inquiry I, only properly offered
through a separate subsidiary. The opponents of AT&T were really
arguing that the Data-Speed 40/4 was a major entrance by AT&T
into the data processing industry. The 1956 Western Electric Consent
Decree had prohibited AT&T from offering data processing equipment or services. The Chief of the FCC Common Carrier Bureau
agreed with the competitors of AT&T. The FCC, however, ultimately
disagreed, and it determined that the Data-Speed 40/4 could be offered by AT&T as a tariffed item.48 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the FCC. 49 As a result of the DataSpeed 40/4 dispute, an additional notice to the Computer Inquiry II
was issued to deal specifically with the problem of terminals possessing communications and data processing capabilities.50 Comments were also sought as to whether customer premises
46. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the FCC's Rules and Regulations, 61
F.C.C.2d 103 (1976) (Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking).
47. Id. The FCC acknowledged the "technological advances, in hardware and
software, which are tending to cause a blurring of the distinctions between data
processing and communications .... In particular, the dramatic advances made in
large scale integrated circuit technology .... minicomputers, microcomputers, and
other special purpose devices ... ." 61 F.C.C.2d at 103.
48. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.C.C.2d 21 (1977). The initial vote by the FCC
was tied, but the FCC finally voted that the Data-Speed 40/4 was properly classed as
a tariffed communication item.
49. IBM Corp. v. FCC, 570 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1973). In interpreting Section 203(a)
of the 1934 Communications Act, the court held that the FCC's classification of a complex of small machines with communicative capacity to send and receive messages
from a central computer as "communications" as opposed to "data processing" was
not improper.
50. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulation, 64
F.C.C.2d 771, 773 (1977). The FCC stated that "new technology has clearly made it
possible for terminals to automatically perform many processing operations which
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equipment (CPE) which performed any information processing
function besides conversion should also be regulated.
B.

ENHANCED SERVICES AND CUSTOMER PREMISES
EQUIPMENT (CPE)

The Final Decision to Computer Inquiry II abandoned the procedures established under Computer Inquiry I for distinguishing between communications and data processing. 51 Instead, the Final
Decision classified all network services as either basic or enhanced,
and it set forth the following:
Basic service is limited to communications common carriers offering transmission capacity for the movement of information,
whereas enhanced service combines basic service with computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted information, or
provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured infor52
mation, or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.

In December 1980, the FCC further refined the distinction between
basic and enhanced services by comparing basic service to a "transmission pipeline," as opposed to enhanced services which are dependent upon basic service, but are different in kind from the
53
pipeline service.
Regarding CPE, the FCC had noted in its Final Decision of May
1980, that "in general, no regulatory distinction should be made between various types of carrier-provided CPE." 54 In the Supplement
they previously performed poorly or not at all by employing techniques previously
limited to central computers."
51. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 77
F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (Final Decision).
52. Id. at 387. In the Tentative Decision, the FCC had distinguished three categories of service-voice, basic non-voice (BNV), and enhanced non-voice (ENV). Carriers owning transmission facilities would have been required to provide ENV through
a separate corporate entity. In addition, the FCC proposed new definitions for distinguishing between communications and data communications for ENV. Resale carriers would have been allowed to offer both ENV communications and ENV data
processing services through common computer facilities. The FCC, however, opted
for the basic/enhanced dichotomy as a more simplified terminology. See Amendment
of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979)
(Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking).
53. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the FCC Rules and Regulations, 84 F.C.C.2d
50, 54 (1980) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
54. 77 F.C.C.2d at 388. In the Tentative Decision the FCC had proposed to define
CPE based on whether the CPE performed more than a basic media conversion
(BMC) function. After public comments, the FCC concluded that:
[Tihe public interest would not be served by classifying CPE based on
whether or not more than a basic media conversion function is performed.
We conclude that, in light of increasing sophistication of all types of CPE and
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of December 1980, however, the FCC did create two subcategories
for use during the transition period for detariffing CPE.5 5 Equipment placed in service after January 1, 1983, and federally tariffed
CPE will be detariffed as of January 1, 1983.56 CPE which is tariffed
at the state level and subject to the separations process is classified
as embedded CPE. 57 Embedded CPE will not be subject to the January 1, 1983, detariffing deadline imposed on new CPE and interstate
CPE, and a separate implementation proceeding will be instituted
for the FCC.
By March 1, 1982, all carrier provided CPE had to be "unbundied" from other service offerings, and carrier provided CPE was
also to be detariffed.5 8 To prevent the rate base from being improperly inflated, the investment of "unbundled" CPE was required to be
removed at the then current book value from the jurisdictional rate
base of each of the respective carriers. Note that the FCC only
detariffed, but did not deregulate enhanced services and CPE.
C.

CORPORATE SEPARATIONS REQUIREMENTS

Given the "significant potential to cross-subsidize or to engage
in other anti-competitive conduct," the FCC initially required both
the varied uses to which CPE can be put while under the user's control, it is
likely that any given classification scheme would impose an artificial, uneconomic constraint on the design and use of CPE. In general, no regulatory distinction should be made between various types of carrier-provided CPE.
Id.
Full analysis of the problem of CPE is made impossible by the leaps in technological advancement that have taken place in the computer communications industry
in the past five years. See supra note 15.
55. 84 F.C.C.2d at 66-67. The FCC acknowledged that under the bifurcated approach some customers during the transition period may pay different rates for
equivalent CPE.
56. Amendment of Section 702 of the FCC's Rules and Regulations, 88 F.C.C.2d
512 (1981) (Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration). In 1981,
AT&T proposed to detariff all CPE at one time. This one step process was called the
"flash cut" approach. The FCC, however, rejected this approach and reiterated its determination to follow its bifurcated approach in detariffing CPE.
57. The Jurisdictional Separations process divides exchange and interexchange
investment into local and interstate categories, and then further apportions the interstate component between the message and private line service categories on the basis of techniques described in a manual which is incorporated by reference in section
702 of the FCC's Rules. See 77 F.C.C.2d at 447-50. In June 1980, the FCC established a
Federal-State Joint Board. See Amendment of Section 702 of the FCC's Rules and
Regulations, 78 F.C.C.2d 837 (1980) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order Establishing a Joint Board). See also 77 F.C.C.2d 224 (1980) (Second Supplemental Notice); 89 F.C.C.2d 1 (1982) (Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking); 90
F.C.C.2d 52 (1982) (Decision and Order).
58. 77 F.C.C.2d at 447-50. See 84 F.C.C.2d at 65-67.
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AT&T and GTE to establish separate corporate entities to provide
enhanced services or CPE. 59 Subsequently, the separate subsidiary
requirement was applied to AT&T alone because of the risk that the
largely captive monopoly ratepayers might be burdened by anticompetitive conduct by AT&T.60 The AT&T subsidiary would not
have been permitted to own or to construct its own transmission facilities; thus, all transmission capacity had to be obtained from an
underlying carrier pursuant to tariff. However, if no common carrier
offered a specific basic service which the Bell subsidiary needed as
part of an enhanced offering, the Bell subsidiary could request from
Bell subsidiary
the Commission a waiver of the prohibition of 6the
1
owning or controlling any transmission facilities.
The 1980 Supplement to Computer Inquiry II further curtailed
the possibility of anticompetitive behavior by modifying the FCC's
initial position on research and development of hardware, firmware,
and generic software. The Final Decision had required that all research and development by a parent for a subsidiary be performed
on a compensatory basis; however, the subsidiary had to perform its
own design and development of nongeneric software. 62 In the 1980
Supplement, the FCC followed the GTC/Telenet merger authorization procedure by requiring the separate subsidiary: (1) either to
perform internally or to have performed by an outside non-Bell affiliated contractor all software and firmware development; and
59. 77 F.C.C.2d at 388-89. The FCC stated that in weighing "the public interest
benefits of our objectives and the economic tradeoffs inherent in a separate subsidiary requirement, we have determined that limited imposition of the requirement will
best serve the communications ratepayer and the public interest more generally."
60. 84 F.C.C.2d at 72-75. The FCC explained its rationale for applying the separate subsidiary requirement only to AT&T by stating that the following factors were
considered:
(a) a carrier's ability to engage in anti-competitive activity through control
over "bottleneck" facilities, i.e., local exchange and toll transmission facilities, on a broad national geographic basis; (b) a carrier's ability to engage in
cross-subsidization to the detriment of the communications ratepayer;
(c) the integrated nature of the carrier and affiliated entities, with special
emphasis upon research and development and manufacturing capabilities
that are used in conjunction with, or are supported by, communications derived revenues; and (d) the carrier's possession of sufficient resources to
enter the competitive market through a separate subsidiary.
84 F.C.C.2d at 75.
61. 84 F.C.C.2d at 78-79. The test for granting a waiver to the prohibition of the
AT&T subsidiary owning transmission facilities was whether "any negative effects on
ratepayers which may arise from grant of a waiver are outweighed by the possibility
of imposition of unreasonable costs upon consumers, or unavailability of an enhanced
service if waiver is not granted."
62. 77 F.C.C.2d at 479-81. Nongeneric software is often called applications
software in the data processing industry.

19831

COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT

(2) either to perform internally or to have performed by any outside
firm (including a Bell System affiliated firm), research and development of equipment into which the software could be inserted. The
separate subsidiary could purchase any equipment from its parent
as long as any software or firmware contained in the equipment was
was the same as that sold "off the shelf' to any
not customized, but
63
interested party.
Furthermore, the FCC set forth rules regarding the information
flow between parent and subsidiary as follows: (1) the basic network had to be released to everyone on the same basis and at the
same time; (2) research and development had to be paid for on a
fully compensatory basis; (3) proprietary information (i.e., customer
lists) of the parent AT&T had to be disclosed to all interested parties
at the same time and under the same terms and conditions; and
(4) a record of each transaction between the parent AT&T and its
unregulated subsidiary had to be filed with the FCC.64 No restrictions were placed on transactions between unregulated Bell subsidiaries. The 1980 Supplement also revised the restriction prohibiting
affiliated Bell entities from purchasing equipment from the separate
subsidiary by prohibiting affiliated Bell entities from purchasing
equipment from the separate subsidiary only if the equipment was
not manufactured by the separate subsidiary. Finally, AT&T was ordered to account for all65 of its costs in establishing any separate unregulated subsidiaries.
Overall, Computer Inquiry II favors AT&T by permitting AT&T
to enter the rapidly growing enhanced services and CPE communications sectors. The restriction separating the parent Bell affiliates
and the separate Bell subsidiary necessary to prevent cross-subsidization will be modified to fit the divestiture of the Bell Operating
Companies (BOC's) from the parent AT&T. These same separations
requirements can be expected to form the basis of the future rules
that the FCC will implement to continue its regulation of the Long
in the unreguLines Division as the parent AT&T begins to compete
66
lated sectors of the telecommunications industry.
63. 84 F.C.C.2d at 79-81.
64. Id. at 81-83. See Application of General Telephone and Electronics Corp. to
Acquire Control of Telenet Corp. and its Wholly-Owned Subsidiary, Telenet Communications Corp., 72 F.C.C.2d Ill (1979), modified, 72 F.C.C.2d 516 (1979).
65. 84 F.C.C.2d at 84.
66. See 77 F.C.C.2d at 475-86. In the Final Decision of May 1980, the FCC, consistent with its enunciated policy of maximum separation, ruled that this degree of separation required (1) separate maintenance of records and books of account, (2) no
joint or common personnel, (3) separate offices, (4) that administrative services
(such as legal services) be provided by the parent on a cost reimbursement basis,
(5) no sharing of computer services, (6) no joint use of the same physical space,
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The divestiture procedure whereby the assets of the Bell System will be divided between the parent AT&T (Bell Headquarters,
Western Electric, Long Lines, and Bell Labs) and the BOC's will be
reviewed by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and by the Department of Justice. Congress and the FCC
can also be expected to review the division of the Bell System's assets and to monitor the effects of the divestiture of the Bell System
pursuant to the settlement of the United States v. AT&T67 case.
IV. FCC ACTIONS PARALLEL TO COMPUTER INQUIRY II
A. AT&T PRICE STUDIES
In 1974, the FCC sponsored a study by Touche Ross & Company
to analyze Western Electric. 68 The Touche Ross Report concluded
that Western Electric was able to avoid "certain costs incurred by
outside manufacturers [in its] expense build-up. ' 69
In 1977, the FCC approached the problem of cross-subsidization
from the perspective of analyzing the price comparisons that AT&T
used to insure that the prices Western Electric charged to the BOCs
were competitive with Bell nonaffiliated product sources. 70 The
FCC concluded that these costs studies were not valid. 71 However,
the Commission did not make any specific order regarding how
AT&T should perform these studies in the future. Instead, the Commission required AT&T to submit a proposal for achieving maximum
separation of its equipment procurement and manufacturing functions, short of divestment of Western Electric. 72 Given the poor
quality of the AT&T price studies, this proceeding also focused on
the "make/buy" decision. Subsequently, in July 1981, the FCC approved an inquiry notice to examine the purchasing practices of the
BOCs. In approving this inquiry notice, the Commission relied
heavily on the previous proceeding in which the Commission had
concluded that the BOCs purchasing system created a bias in favor
of Western Electric products and that Western Electric had an input
(7) that any technical information disclosed to the separate subsidiary be released to
competitors of the subsidiary at the same time and on the same terms and conditions, and (8) that no software or firmware be designed by the parent for the subsidiary except if the software or firmware was embedded in or integral to some of the
CPE obtained from the parent.
67. See supra note 4.
68. Touche Ross & Co., Final Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Western Electric Co. (Jan. 3, 1974) (F.C.C. Contract RC-10195).
69. Id. at 68.
70. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 64 F.C.C.2d 1 (1977) (Final Decision and Order).
71. Id. at 61-101.
72. Id. at 43-45.
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into virtually
73

every

step of the

"make/buy" decision-making

process.
Therefore, although not specifically related to Computer Inquiry
11, these proceedings indicate the philosophical approach that the
FCC has taken to formulate conduct changes in the Bell system.
Under Computer Inquiry II, the FCC will have to be careful to esto favor
tablish procedures which prevent the unregulated decisions
74
itself at the expense of rate-payers using Long Lines.
B.

UNIFORM SYSTEM OF AccouNTs (USOA)

In 1978, the FCC also began to examine and revise the Uniform
System of Accounts (USOA), which had remained virtually unchanged since its adoption in 1935. 75 The Commission noted that
76
the USOA was based on a company-wide breakdown of costs.
Given the multi-service telecommunications environment, the Commission determined that due to the introduction of competition in
the specialized services and terminal equipment areas, more specific
service-related cost and revenue information, with interstate and intrastate (as opposed to the company-wide data as provided by the
USOA) breakdowns of cost for each service was required for proper
regulation. 77 The ultimate goal of the revised USOA is a single
database for state and federal regulators and the elimination of the
cost studies that AT&T had been required to perform to justify its
requests for rate increases. 7 8 In addition to the goals of a single
73. See 64 F.C.C.2d 1.
74. See Comment, Communications-The FCC,As an Alternative to Divestment of
Western Electric, Ordered Greater Autonomy for the Bell Operating Companies in
PurchasingDivisions, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 1521 (1977).
75. Revision of the Uniform System of Accounts and Financial Reporting Requirements for Telephone Companies (Parts 31, 33, 42 and 43 of the FCC's Rules), 70
F.C.C.2d 719 (1978) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). In making its revision, the
FCC includes an examination of the early history of the USOA.
76. Id. at 721. Historically, the primary rate-making criteria were overall investment and expense levels, property valuations, and depreciation rates. In recent
years, rate cases have dealt increasingly with rate levels and rate structures of specific services. The starting point in setting appropriate rate levels and rate structures
for specific services is the relative cost of providing the services.
77. Id. at 724-25.
78. The FCC stated:
[To remedy] the inadequacies of the current USOA, we are proposing a comIt
prehensive modification of the existing accounting system as a whole ....
is our intention that the revised accounting system which will result from
this proceeding will constitute a single data base serving the following
functions:
(1) It will form the basis for financial reports, including both balance sheet
and income statement reporting. (2) It will serve as a data base and a foundation for rhanagerial decision-making and internal management reports by
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database and the elimination of AT&T's cost studies, in light of Computer Inquiry II, the USOA will be revised so as to prevent crosssubsidization between the regulated Long Lines Division and the
is continuing its study of
unregulated divisions of AT&T. The FCC
79
proceedings.
various
through
USOA
the
C.

MANUAL AND PROCEDURES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF COSTS

In another related matter, in 1979, the FCC initiated a proceeding to develop procedures for AT&T to use in allocating costs among
its various services. 80 The cost allocation procedures that AT&T was
to follow were the general guidelines established by the FCC in
Docket Number 18128.81
In 1980, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.82 The
the carriers. (3) It will provide sufficiently detailed disaggregated cost and
revenue information for derivation of costs and revenues of individual services and rate elements, for pricing decisions and other managerial decisionmaking by the carriers. (4) It similarly will provide detailed disaggregated
cost and revenue information for derivation of costs and revenues of individual services and rate elements, for rate review and continuing surveillance
purposes of this Commission (and other regulatory bodies which adopt the
revision) and provide a basis for rate prescription, where appropriate. (5) It
will facilitate the breakdown of costs between interstate and intrastate jurisdictions ("Jurisdictional Separations"). (6) It will permit analysis of facility
and plant utilization, including studies of the causes for each category of expenditure and review of service quality and service efficiency. And (7) it will
be structured so as to allow for regulatory and independent auditing and
tracing of questioned entries.
Id. at 724-25.
79. Another aspect of the USOA, depreciation, has also recently been examined.
See Amendment of Part 31 (Uniform System of Accounting for Class A and Class B
Telephone Companies), 83 F.C.C.2d 267 (1980).
80. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 F.C.C.2d 629, 630 (1979) (Notice of Inquiry). In its
Notice ofInquiry, the FCC noted that:
competitive methods for diverse telecommunication services remain in their
infancy. Dominant carriers still possess sufficient market power to cross-subsidize among services and users. Such cross-subsidization might nullify or
otherwise restrain the emergence of fully-developed competitive telecommunication markets. Consequently, the implementation of Commission-approved costing principles for dominant carriers generally, and AT&T in
particular, is crucial to the promotion and further development of sustainable, competitive telecommunication markets of the future.
Id. at 630.
81. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dept., 81 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976), recon.,
64 F.C.C.2d 971 (1977),further recon., 67 F.C.C.2d 1441 (1978), affd sub noma. Aeronautical Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 642 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 920 (1980).
The FCC had attempted in Docket 18128 to establish basic principles and standards
of general applicability for determining cost of service and corresponding rate levels
by service category. 451 U.S. at 976.
82. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 78 F.C.C.2d 1296 (1980) (Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking).
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Commission stated that the cost allocation manual which they had
proposed, although not a "perfect solution," was necessary to allow
the Commission to fulfill its statutory obligations. 83 This proposed
manual was to be an interim manual, and more suggestions and
comments were sought on long-term approaches to the potential
problem of cross-subsidization. The Commission was most concerned with cross-subsidization of private line services by message
services. The chief concern was that AT&T's dominant position in
the provision of message service would allow it to overcharge
message customers in order to cross-subsidize private line service,
84
and thereby weaken or prevent competition in this area.
Therefore, private lines are to be aggregated into a single category for reporting purposes. To simplify, but still have the data verifiable, the FCC proposed to increase reliance on separations for
allocation purposes. This interim manual does not lessen the bur85
den on AT&T to demonstrate the validity of its tariff filing.1
Three major types of allocation procedure were suggested by
the commenting parties, 86 but the FCC concluded that each accounting method suffered fatal shortcomings. 87 The FCC required, there83. Id. at 1297.
84. Id. at 1298.
85. Id. at 1298-99. The FCC also noted that the simplification of reporting requirements and added flexibility did not constitute a "carte blanche" to AT&T to engage in
unjust, unreasonable or unlawfully discriminatory pricing practices. The Commission's "interest in eliminating unnecessary complexity is related to our intent that
the allocation of costs be verifiable and not unduly subject to management discretion
...while existing separation procedures . . . may be amended in the near future,
they nevertheless constitute an existing, externally mandated system of allocation
which is readily subject to audit." Id. at 1299.
86. Id. at 1307-12. AT&T proposed to modify the existing system, but the FCC
viewed AT&T's proposed modified system as still impossible to understand and monitor. The second method, proposed by Walter Hinchman & Associates, Inc., was extremely complex, and in some areas went beyond an allocation technique and
involved restriction on AT&T. The third method was Western Union's "top-down" approach. Although a simplified method, this "top-down" approach required identification of factors that would lead to the division of the interstate costs to various
services; these factors were not identified in the report.
87. In its Summary, the FCC concludecE
A system of cost allocation must be understandable, verifiable, and, insofar
as it assigns costs based upon forecasts and other inputs which are strongly
subject to management discretion, capable of being checked for accuracy
.... AT&T's cost allocation methods have prevented us from prescribing
new rates in situations where filed tariffs have been found unlawful ....
We believe that a cost allocation mechanism must be sufficiently understandable to permit us to take appropriate remedial action if we find that improper
rates have been fied.
Id. at 1329.
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fore, that an interim plan be implemented by AT&T.88 Under the
interim plan, AT&T is required to allocate interstate revenues, investment, and expense to four service categories: MTS, WATS, Private Line, and ENFIA. 89 This FCC proceeding concerning the
establishment of a revised Manual and Procedures for the Allocation of Costs continues.
D.

EXECUNET CONTROVERSY

The Execunet controversy showed the further development of
the FCC's free-entry policy while Computer Inquiry II was being decided.9 0 In MCI Telecommunications Corporationv. FCC 9 1 (hereinafter Execunet), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
ruled that the FCC could not deny specialized carriers the right to
expand intercity telephone services in the absence of a finding by
the FCC that such expansion was not in the public interest. Later,
in a DeclaratoryRuling,92 the FCC ruled that AT&T was under no
obligation to provide the local physical interconnections necessary
for MCI's Execunet service. AT&T, relying on the FCC's Declaratory
Ruling, refused to supply MCI the local physical interconnections
required for the Execunet service. MCI then challenged the Declaratory Ruling in federal court. 93 The court specifically invalidated
the FCC's ruling that AT&T was under no obligation to provide local
distribution facilities for MCI's Execunet service. 94 Consequently,
while Computer Inquiry II was progressing within the FCC, the effect of the court's decision was to allow MCI to offer specialized
services such as Execunet. 95
88. Id. at 1311-12.
89. ENFIA was developed as a temporary category pending completion of the
FCC's access charge investigation. See AT&T Manual and Procedures for the Allocation of Costs, 84 F.C.C.2d 384, 406 (1980) (Report and Order), 86 F.C.C.2d 107 (1981)
(Order), recon. in part, 86 F.C.C.2d 667 (1981) (Order on Reconsideration).
90. See G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 224-30 (1981).
91. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 60 F.C.C.2d 25 (1976), rev'd sub nom. MCI
Telecommunication Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1040 (1978). A push button telephone subscriber to "Execunet" is able to reach any
telephone in a distant city served by MCI by dialing a local MCI number, followed by
an access code and the phone number in the distant city.
92. Petition of AT&T for a Declaratory Ruling and Expedited Relief, 67 F.C.C.2d
1455 (1978) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
93. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
94. Id. at 591.
95. See Warren, Intercity Telecommunications Competition After Execunet, 31
FED. COM. L.J. 117 (1978).
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E.

MTS AND WATS MARKET STRUCTURE

In response to the Execunet controversy, in 1978, the FCC instituted a proceeding to determine "whether the public interest would
be better served by conferring single source status upon MTS and
WATS, in whole or in part, or by authorizing some other kind of industry structure. '9 6 Subsequently, in 1979, the FCC issued a Supplemental Notice requesting comments by interested parties on the
optimal industry structure and entry policy for the MTS-WATS market.9 7 The FCC concluded that, except for the Alaskan interstate
market, the MTS-WATS market was open to entry, effectively permitting individual and corporate consumers to enter the MTS-WATS
98
market.
F. COMSAT AND SBS
Computer system vendors and communications common carriers are interested in satellite communications technology because
satellites provide an attractive opportunity for major cost reductions.9 9 Significant reductions in the costs of communications are
particularly attractive to computer system vendors as they expand
their computer design options. The Communications Satellite Act of
1962100 established the Communications Satellite Corporation
(COMSAT), which is owned half by the general public and half by
overseas carriers. COMSAT is still in operation and has launched
several satellites and established a communications network.' 0 '
In the late 1960's, the FCC conducted a four-year study of the
role of satellites in domestic communications, and in 1970, it concluded that satellites could play a major role in domestic communi96. MTS and WATS Market Structure, 67 F.C.C.2d 757, 758 (1978) (Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking). "MTS" stands for Message Telecommunications
Service, and "WATS" stands for Wide Area Telephone Service.
97. MTS and WATS Market Structure, 73 F.C.C.2d 222 (1979) (Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking). The FCC encouraged the parties to describe regulatory policies that the Commission should adopt with respect to entry
policy for the MTS-WATS market.
98. See MTS and WATS Market Structure, 77 F.C.C.2d 224 (1980) (Second Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking); MTS and WATS Market Structure, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, 202-03, 214 (1980) (Report and Third Supplemental Notice of
Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking); MTS and WATS Market Structure, 90 F.C.C.2d
135 (1982) (Fourth Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking).
99. See Kelley, Satellites Save Money, 26 INFOSYSTEMS, July 1979, at 42. See also
The Gold Mine in Satellite Services, Bus. WEEK, April 6, 1981, at 89, 90.
100. Communications Satellite Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-624, 76 Stat. 419 (1962)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 701 (1976)).
101. See Socol, Corsat's First Decade, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 678 (1977).
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cations. 10 2 The FCC then invited potential satellite applicants to
submit concrete system proposals. In its 1972 Domsat II decision,
the FCC, recognizing that each potential applicant presented possible antitrust problems, rejected the suggestion that entry be limited
to one or a small number of entrants. 10 3 Instead the FCC asserted
that "there may well be advantages to and need for voluntary considerations or sharing arrangements (such as "launch risk pools"),"
and it indicated its willingness to approve applications involving
joint ventures so long as they were consistent with its policy of encouraging multiple entry and competition.'l 4
AT&T and COMSAT proposed a domestic satellite system
wherein AT&T would lease communications satellites and associated services from COMSAT. 0 5 To prevent antitrust abuses in the
AT&T and COMSAT joint venture, the FCC required that: (1) COMSAT be a minority participant in the joint venture; (2) no AT&T officer or director could serve as a director of COMSAT; and
(3) COMSAT establish a separate corporate entity to operate the
06
domestic satellite system.
COMSAT had previously entered into a joint venture (called
CML Satellite Corporation) with Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and
MCI Communications Corporation to operate a domestic satellite
communications system. In 1974, COMSAT and IBM filed a joint petition for FCC approval of changes in the corporate structure of
102. Establishment of Domestic Communication--Satellite Facilites by Non-governmental Entites, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970) (Report and Order) ("Domsat I"). See Orr,
Satellite CommunicationsTakes a Big Leap Forward, 73 A.B.A. BANKING J., Jan. 1981,
at 76; Evans, Satellite Communications-The Legal Gap, 11 JURIMETRICS J., Dec. 1970,
at 92.
103. Establishment of Domestic Communications-Satellite Facilities by Non-governmental Entities, 35 F.C.C.2d 644, 647 (1972) (Second Report and Order) ("Domsat
I"). The FCC stated: "the presence of competitive sources of supply of specialized
services, both among satellite system licensees and between satellite and terrestrial
systems, should encourage service and technical innovation and provide an impetus
for efforts to minimize costs and charges to the public." (emphasis added) After the
Domsat II decision, the FCC approved the applications of AT&T, RCA, Hughes Aircraft Company,'GTE, and American Satellite. See Satellite Business Sys., 62 F.C.C.2d
997, 1063-73 (1;, 7); American Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 F.C.C.2d 654 (1973); RCA Global Communications, 'Inc., & RCA Alaska Communications, Inc., 42 F.C.C.2d 774 (1973);
Hughes Aircraft Co. (National Satellite Services, Inc.) & GTE Satellite Corp., 43
F.C.C.2d 430 (1973); and American Satellite Corp., 43 F.C.C.2d 348 (1973). The lack of
an FCC evidentiary hearing was upheld by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. See Network Project v. FCC, 511 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
104. 35 F.C.C.2d at 850; see also 62 F.C.C.2d at 1037.
105. The application of AT&T and Comsat was filed in response to Domsat I, 22
F.C.C.2d 86 (1970) (Report and Order), See 35 F.C.C.2d at 851-53.
106. 38 F.C.C.2d 655, 676-88 (1972). (Memorandum Order and Opinion). See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 42 F.C.C.2d 654 (1973).
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CML.10 7 It was proposed that after the withdrawal of Lockheed and
MCI from the CML venture, COMSAT and IBM would operate a
joint venture for a domestic satellite system. In 1975, the FCC rejected the COMSAT/IBM proposal, but it delineated the conditions
under which COMSAT and IBM could participate in a joint venture
for a domestic satellite system. These conditions included requiring: (1) the joint venture to provide for interconnection of its customers' data processing and communications systems on reasonable
terms and without discrimination; (2) the details of the interconnection to be submitted in advance to the FCC; (3) IBM to create a separate subsidiary to operate the satellite system; and (4) COMSAT
and IBM to conform to one of three permissible forms of business
organization.
In compliance with the FCC's fourth requirement, the two companies chose the "balanced CML option" (one of the three permissible forms); and in December 1975, COMSAT, IBM, and Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company (through its subsidiary, Aetna Satellite Communications, Inc.), applied to the FCC for a license to operate a domestic satellite system as a joint effort under the name
Satellite Business Systems (SBS). 0 8 Opponents objected to the
SBS proposal on numerous grounds, including antitrust considerations. 109 Yet, in February 1977, after extensive filing, the FCC denied
the request by opponents for a formal evidentiary hearing, and it
granted SBS a license. 1 0 Although American Satellite, Western
Union, AT&T, and the Department of Justice appealed the FCC SBS
Decision on the grounds that the FCC had not properly reviewed
the antitrust considerations of the SBS joint venture in an evidentiary hearing. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the FCC decision to permit SBS to operate a domestic satellite
communications system."'
The various FCC proceedings involving applications for satellite
communications systems are yet another example of the FCC's
open entry policy. The requirements for entry into this market are
limited to a basic fitness requirement. Although the FCC will not
impose a structural requirement that each entrant be a separate corporation. Rather, the FCC can be expected to closely regulate all
satellite entrants, to evaluate each entrant, and to adopt appropriate
107. Petition for Approval of Changes in Corporate Structure of CML Satellite
Corp., 51 F.C.C.2d 14 (1975). CML stood for the three initial partners in the COMSAT
joint venture: COMSAT, MCI, and Lockheed.
108. Satellite Business Sys., 62 F.C.C.2d 997, 998 (1977).
109. 62 F.C.C.2d at 1014-15.
110. 62 F.C.C.2d at 1029-32, 1061-99.
111. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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conduct constraints, such as the requirement imposed on SBS to
treat all prospective customers equally.
G.

SUMMARY

While the Computer Inquiry II was in progress, the FCC was
holding numerous related proceedings. The FCC will need to monitor carefully the procurement decisions of Long Lines to avoid unfair favoritism by Long Lines to its unregulated parent-AT&T. The
USOA will also need to be modified by the FCC to prevent crosssubsidization between the regulated portions of Long Lines and the
unregulated AT&T. Finally, the proceedings concerning the Manual
and Proceduresfor Allocation of Costs will need to continue.
V. THE CONGRESSIONAL SCENE
A.

CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO REVISE THE

1934

COMMUNICATIONS ACT

After the Department of Justice filed the United States v.
AT&T" 2 antitrust case in 1974, Congress began to study the telecommunications industry, and consequently, several bills were introduced.1 13 Some of these early bills nearly passed in the House of
Representatives or the Senate. An analysis of these initial legislative efforts reveals the evolution of present communications law.
One of these early attempts to revise the 1934 Communications
Act was the 1976 AT&T-supported Consumer Communications Reform Act. 1 4 Opponents charged that the bill should have been
called the Monopoly Protection Act of 1976 because it would have removed most of the FCC's authority over the national communications network and given this authority to the states' public utilities
commissions. Specifically, the bill would have: (1) transferred jurisdiction over station equipment and terminal equipment from the
FCC to the states; (2) given the states authority to set intercommunications rules, to define station equipment, and to dictate the terms
under which the equipment could be marketed; and (3) permitted
states to control the interconnection of interstate specialized common carriers to the AT&T local distribution networks. 115 Opponents
112. See supra note 4.
113. See infra notes 114-83 and accompanying text. See generally Loeb, The Communications Act Policy Toward Competition: A Failure to Communicate, 1978 DUKE
LJ. 1 (contains an excellent review of the historical origins and passage of, and developments affecting, the Communications Act of 1934 through the mid-1970s).
114. S. 3192, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
115. See Biddle, Computer Industry Association Position Statement [Consumer
Communications Reform Act of 1976], TELECOM., Nov. 1976, at 18; Ellinghaus, What the
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of the legislation sponsored a Pro-Competition Resolution, and after
hearings in committees on communications in both houses, the bill
6
died."
A 1978 bill in the House of Representatives would have required
AT&T to divest Western Electric," 7 and an early 1979 House bill
would have required AT&T to deal at arms length with all of its subsidiaries." 8 AT&T claimed that both bills were seriously deterimental to the ability of AT&T to operate the national core
communication network; both bills were defeated. 1 9 In December
1979, H.R. 6121 was introduced and successfully moved through subcommittee, but was adversely reported by the Committee of the Judiciary due to antitrust concerns. 2 0° In 1977 and 1978, the Senate
also attempted to establish communications policy, and it introthese bills, howduced several bills and held numerous hearings;
2
ever, suffered a fate similar to the House bills.' '
Although both the House and Senate bills adopted the concept
of a separate subsidiary, they differed over the degree of separation
that should be required. Both would have modified the 1956 Western
Electric Consent Decree, but the House bill was stronger on limiting

AT&T in mass media. Although both agreed on the concept of supporting the local urban networks through access charges, the first
six years of developing access charges were to be administered differently. And both the House and the Senate agreed that to maintain reasonable rural telephone rates a subsidy for rural networks
would be necessary.

22

B. THE 1981 PACKWOOD BiLL (S. 898)
In 1981, Senator Packwood introduced Senate Bill 898, the "TelePublic Should Know About the Consumer Communications Reform Act, TELEPHONY,
Oct. 4, 1976, at 84.
116. H.R.J. RES. 285, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Tim Wirth (DColo.)); S.J. RES. 30, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced by Gary Hart (D-Colo.)).
117. See H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
118. See H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
119. See Sarasohn, Telecommunications Rewrite Tries to Unfetter Industry, CONG.
Q., Feb. 16, 1980, at 389.
120. See H.R. 6121, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. Rep. No. 1252, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1980).
121. For a discussion of these cases, see O'Riordan, An Examination of the Application of Common CarrierRegulation to Entities Providing New Telecommunication

Services, 29 CASE W. REs. L REV. 577 (1979).
122. See S. 2827, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. 6121, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
See Sarasohn, AT&T Restructured: New Objections Show Dare of Communications
Rewrite, CONG. Q., July 12, 1980, at 1943.
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communications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981. ' ' 123 Senator Packwood announced at the bill's introduction that "it has been
our view that Congress, not the courts or the Federal Communications Commission, should establish national communications policy."'1 24 In effect, the bill was an attempt to deregulate the
telecommunciations industry and to offer parameters for future regulation of the telecommunications field. 125 Under the bill, the FCC
would have been encouraged to foster competition in the market for
interexchange telecommunications, with regulation only as necessary. For example, regulation would have been required in the case
of a market where no alternative carriers were available to provide
telecommunications services, but regulation was not a foregone conclusion where more than one service was available. 126 Carriers
would have been regulated according to the classifications set forth
in the bill. 127 The FCC would have retained the power to regulate
all markets to insure the availability of telecommunications services
at reasonable rates 128 and the power to regulate dominant carriers
defined in the bill. 129 AT&T was specifically designated as a dominant carrier, and thereby kept within the regulatory authority of the
130
FCC by specific intention.
Senate Bill 898 proposed several amendatory additions to the
Communications Act of 1934, each specifically directed toward
AT&T. 13 1 For example, the bill would have required AT&T to establish a separate subsidiary to compete in deregulated markets132 and
would have provided procedures for AT&T to follow in conducting
its research and development and its manufacturing activities during the interim period until full separation from the affiliates was
achieved. 133 Requirements for a "fully separated affiliate" were
clearly defined, 134 with a timetable provided for the telecommunications giant to follow in the process of cutting loose its operating
companies. 1'
Nothing in the language of Senate Bill 898 required
123. S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
124. 127 CONG. REC. 83,544 (1981).
125. See Trienens, DeregulationIn the Telecommunications Industry: A Status Report, 50 ANTrrRusT L. 409 (1982).
126. S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 102, 201.
127. Id. §§ 201, 205.
128. Id. § 203.
129. Id. § 204.
130. Id. §§ 205, 229.

131. Id. § 223.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id. §§ 223, 227.
Id.
Id. §§ 223, 228. Section 228(a) stated that "until such time as the American
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the total divestiture of the subsidiary companies, although strict requirements were established for the relationship of the "affiliates"
to the parent company; these requirements were to apply to the
subsidiary that would offer enhanced services. The fully separated
affiliate and the parent: (1) could have only one common director
(similar to the 1980 House Bill) 136 ; (2) could not have any joint officers or employees (similar to both the 1980 House and Senate
bills)137; (3) would have to maintain separate books and records,
and records which have to be fully auditable (similar to both the
1980 House and Senate bills) 138; (4) could not have any joint or common property except for international telecommunications facilities
or properties (slightly different than either the 1980 House or Senate
bill) 139; and (5) could only engage in joint institutional advertising
on a compensatory basis (similar to both the 1980 House and Senate
bills).140 Consequently, the dominant regulated carriers were to be
prohibited from conducting business with their fully separated affiliates on a preferential basis and were to be prohibited from crosssubsidizing the unregulated separate subsidiary. 14 1 Under Senate
Bill 898, the FCC role in the reorganization of AT&T would have
been that of a watchdog. Before offering unregulated services, AT&T
would have had to receive FCC approval of a plan for complying
with the transition to fully separate affiliates. 142 The FCC would
have been permitted to waive the proposed statutory transition
schedule if intervening forces rendered AT&T incapable of
14 3
compliance.
The 1956 Western Union Consent Decree was to be construed so
as to permit AT&T to enter the data processing computer field
through an unregulated subsidiary. 144 Consequently, AT&T and its
affiliates would have been permitted to provide telecommunications
services or equipment, 145 as well as information services, so long as
these services and products were offered by fully separated affiliTelephone and Telegraph Company and its affiliates (hereinafter referred to in this
section as AT&T) establish fully separated affiliates pursuant to this section and section 227, the provisions of this section shall apply in any case ..
136. Id. §§ 223, 227(a)(1).
137. Id. §§ 223, 227(a)(2).
138. Id. §§ 223, 227(a)(3).
139. Id. §§ 223, 227(d)(1).
140. Id. §§ 223, 227(d) (2).
141. Id. §§ 223, 227(e)(1).
142. Id. §§ 223, 228.
143. Id. §§223, 228(c)(6)(A),(B). Examples of intervening forces were labor
strikes, war, severe economic depression, and acts of God.
144. Id. §§ 223, 229.
145. Id. §§ 223, 229(d)(2)(B).
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ates. 146 Although in October 1981, the Senate passed Senate Bill 898,
no further action as taken on the Packwood bill because of subsequent court action.
C.

THE 1981 WIRTH BILL (H.R. 5158)

In December 1981, Representative Wirth introduced House of
Representatives Bill 5158 (hereinafter H.R. 5158), a bill to reform Title II of the Communications Act of 1934.147 In January 1982, the
Justice Department and AT&T announced a proposed settlement of
the seven-year antitrust litigation. The agreement would have required AT&T to divest its twenty-two local operating companies,
which constituted two-thirds of AT&T's assets, in return for the Justice Department's lifting of the restrictions imposed on AT&T in the
1956 Western Electric Consent Decree. These restrictions had kept
AT&T from entering the telecommunications field or any other unregulated activity. 148 The subcommittee hearing which followed became a focal point for the debate over the adequacy of the proposed
settlement. In March 1982, the subcommittee unveiled a substitute
bill which dealt with the perceived deficiencies of the proposed set149
tlement in United States v. AT&T.
The subcommittee began a comprehensive review of competition in the telecommunications industry, and it printed the results
in a lengthy staff report. 150 The substitute H.R. 5158 was designed
(1) to protect the viability of the local operating companies after divestiture; (2) to prevent local rates from increasing dramatically due
to the loss of subsidization from long distance revenues; and (3) to
guard against AT&T taking anti-competitive actions, especially in
the unregulated sectors of the communications industry. 15 1 H.R.
5158 was approved unanimously in March 1982, and it went substantially beyond both the proposed United States v. AT&T settlement
and S. 898.152
The purpose of H.R. 5158 was to guarantee the public a reliable,
efficient, and diverse telecommunications service at reasonable and
146. Id. §§ 227-29.
147. H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
148. See Sarasohn, House Panel Approves Bill Adding New Limits to AT&T, CONG.
Q., March 27, 1982, at 688.
149. Id. at 688. See supra note 4.
150. House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection and Finance, Telecommunications in Transition: The Status of
Competition in the Telecommunications Industry, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
151. H.R. 5158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 201, 205 (1981).
152. See supra notes 4 & 123.
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affordable rates. 153 To achieve this goal, the forces of open and com154
petitive markets were to be relied upon rather than regulation.
Under H.R. 5158, the FCC was directed to deregulate competitive
markets and to promote competition in those markets lacking
55
competition.
1. Regulatory Authority of the FCC
Under H.R. 5158, the FCC's authority over exchange, interexchange, and international transmissions would have been limited. 56 State public utilities commissions and the FCC were to be
(1) forbidden from considering the revenues or profits derived from
the offering of any unregulated products or services (except for Yellow Pages) by any affiliate or separate subsidiary of a regulated carrier when determining the revenue requirements of any regulated
service of such carrier and (2) prohibited from regulating new terminal equipment, new inside wiring, and resale or shared use of any
transmission service or enhanced service. 157 The FCC would also
have been required to classify carriers that owned interexchange
transmission facilities as either dominant carriers, regulated carriers, or deregulated carriers (AT&T would have been the only dominant carrier under the bill). 158 Telephone companies that were
currently providing joint long distance and local exchange services
159
were to be classified as regulated carriers.
2. Interexchange Transmission
After an initial transition period of five years, the FCC would
have exercised sole authority over all interexchange (toll) transmission, whether intrastate or interstate, except for intrastate toll transmissions of exchange carriers serving not more than 500,000
customer access lines. Deregulation of any given carrier would have
depended upon a determination by the FCC that there were adequate alternatives to the service/facility. 60 Alternatives would have
been considered adequate if they were substitutable in quality and
comparable in both economic cost and geographic range to the relevant service or facility.' 6' Regulated carriers would have been com153. Id. § 201(a).
154. Id.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. § 201(b)-(c).
Id. § 211.
Id.
Id. § 212.
Id.

160. Id.

161. Id. § 213.
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pelled to furnish, upon reasonable request, "regulated services" or
those for which there were inadequate facilities available.
The tariffs established for these services were required to be
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. 162 No tariff for a given regulated service could include any costs associated with the provision
of any other service or product, and the burden of showing a tariff to
be just and reasonable was placed on the carrier. 163 Carriers offering enhanced services would have been compelled to do so on an
unbundled basis. To prevent cross-subsidization, facilities constructed for the purpose of enhancing service, as opposed to trans164
mission, would not have been included in the regulated rate base.
3. Exchange Transmission
To prevent the use of local exchange facilities to create a bottleneck to restrict interexchange, enhanced services, or terminal equipment competition, H.R. 5158 would have required exchange carriers
after 1986 to offer all interexchange carriers access on an equal basis
including equal access in type, quality, and range of supporting
functions. Exchange carriers would have also been required to interconnect any terminal equipment, inside wiring, or transmission
165
services or facilities that met federal technical standards.
In order to protect exchange carriers, all interexchange transmission offered by a dominant carrier would have been required to
originate and terminate through the facilities of exchange carrier
until 1988. This would prevent a dominant carrier from "bypassing"
a local exchange for the sole benefit of large users of long distance
service. To subsidize the costs of exchange service in rural or remote areas, all interexchange carriers would have been required to
contribute to a National Telecommunications Fund. 66 The payments from this fund wre also intended to ease the transition from
the current jurisdictional separation rules to a system which allocated costs between exchange and interexchange services. Exchange access charges would have been frozen subject to the
Consumer Price Index until such time as the access charges took
167
effect.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 212-13, 221-23, 226.
§§ 223, 226.
§§ 222, 226, 228.
§§ 232, 233.
§ 234.
§§ 232, 233.
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4. TelecommunicationsEquipment
The FCC would have retained authority to establish technical
standards for transmission facilities and services, and interconnection of terminal equipment. 168 After a transition period of two years,
no regulated carrier nor any regulated exchange carrier would have
been able to file a tariff which included any cost associated with or
16 9
caused by the provision of terminal equipment or inside wiring.
Terminal equipment would have had to have been offered on an unbundled basis.
To promote the development of a domestic competitive industry
for the manufacture of transmission facilities, the bill would have required regulated carriers and regulated exchange carriers affiliated
with facilities manufacturers to procure all products on a nondiscriminatory basis. 7 0 These carriers would also have had to provide
specifications to all manufacturers in order to foster competitive
procurement.
5. Dominant Carriers
The bill would have required AT&T to offer transmission facilities and services only through a separate subsidiary.' 7 ' Not more
than 50% of the subsidiary's board of directors could consist of employees, officers, or directors of AT&T. 172 All transactions between
173
the parent and subsidiary were to be on an arm's-length basis.
Joint ventures by AT&T and the subsidiary would have been prohibited. 7 4 The subsidiary would have been required to conduct its own
marketing, sales, advertising, installation of equipment, hiring and
training of personnel, maintenance, operations, manufacturing, and
research and development. 7 5 Finally, the subsidiary would have
176
had to maintain its own books, records, and accounts.
All of AT&T's transmission facilities and services would have
been required to be offered through the subsidiary on a regulated
basis, and AT&T would have been forbidden from constructing, owning, or operating duplicate, unregulated transmission facilities until
77
effective, facilities-based competition came into being.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. §§ 241, 242.
Id. § 242.
Id. § 243.
Id. § 251.
Id. § 252(b).
Id. § 252(d).
Id. § 252(g).
Id. § 252(h).
Id. § 252(c).
Id. § 253.
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6. Telecommunications Industry
Carriers would have been allowed jointly to meet, plan, and
agree, under the auspices of the FCC, on matters affecting the design, maintenance, management, development, and coordination of
any network of telecommunications services or facilities. Meetings
with the purpose or effect of violating federal or state antitrust laws,
however, were prohibited. 178 To promote the widest possible diversity of information sources, no dominant carrier or its separate subsidiary would have been allowed to offer any information services
over its own transmission facilities except for (1) limited directories;
(2) time or weather information; (3) printed directory advertising;
(4) electronic directory information; and (5) audio information services. 179 Mergers between owners of transmission facilities would
have been limited by the FCC, and regulated exchange carriers
would have been barred from providing cable television or broadcasting services in areas in which they were offering exchange serv180
ices, with an exception for carriers serving rural areas.
7. Protection of Ratepayers and Employees in Transition
To protect ratepayers in the transition to a competitive marketplace for telecommunications, installed terminal equipment would
have had to be made available to the customer under regulation until it was fully depreciated. Alternatively, customers would have had
the option of purchasing installed equipment for a price determined
by a state commission. State public utilities commissions would
have had the authority to auction fully depreciated or returned installed equipment so as to aid in the orderly development of a competitive secondary market in terminal equipment, and to ensure that
ratepayers were fully compensated for the transfer of equipment to
18 1
carriers' unregulated activities.
The bill would also have established a transitional joint board,
composed of three FCC commissioners and two state commissioners (1) to review exchange area boundary disputes; (2) to establish
the formulas for funding, and to establish procedures for distributing funds from the National Telecommunications Fund; (3) to modify the jurisdictional separation and settlements procedures as
necessary for the orderly transition to the system of exchange access charges; (4) to determine joint and common costs for long distance services; (5) to advise the FCC on equal exchange access; and
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

261.
263.
264.
271-72.
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(6) to evaluate the assets of regulated carriers. 182 The legislation
would have given ratepayers the fruits of the research they had
funded at Bell Labs by requiring AT&T to grant nonexclusive
licenses for all patents currently existing or developed within two
years of passage of the bill for products manufactured in the United
States.
8. Viability of Operating Companies
Prior to asset valuation, AT&T would have been required to distribute to its shareholders securities which represented interests in
the assets or businesses of the newly created operating companies.
By requiring such divestiture before valuation of the assets, the officials of the operating companies would have had a legal duty to promote and protect the independent corporate interests of the
operating companies. No particular form of reorganization was imposed; the bill simply required that divestiture occur, and that after
reorganization, no operating company's securities include any interest in another operating company or in AT&T. 183 A key component
in asset valuation would have been the allocation of debt, some of
which AT&T would have had to assume in return for its acquisition
of billions of dollars of the operating companies' assets. The bill
provided that AT&T take an equitable distribution of the operating
companies' debt with respect to the interest rate and dates of maturity of the debt instruments.
VI. ANTITRUST LITIGATION
A.

PRIVATE PLAINTIFF ANTITRUST LITIGATION AGAINST

AT&T

During the last several years, AT&T has continuously been involved as a defendant in anywhere from twenty to sixty active antitrust suits. 184 Given this large number of antitrust suits, and the
obvious drain on the AT&T management in supporting this level of
litigation, there appears to be a trend in the late 1970's and early
1980's for AT&T to settle, where and when appropriate, as many
cases as possible. In June 1980, increased pressure was put on the
settlement trend by AT&T's antitrust trial loss in MCI Communications, Inc. v. AT&T, 185 which after trebling, amounted to 1.8 billion
182. Id. § 273.
183. Id. §§ 252(j)-(k), 253(e)-(f).
184. See Current Case Table, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) (Sept. 13, 1982). Twentynine cases are listed in the Current Case Table, and others are listed in the main
Case Table.
185. See TELECOM. REP., March 3, 1980, at 5 (No. 9), which discusses a settlement
in which AT&T agreed to purchase two billion dollars of telecommunications products
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dollars. AT&T has appealed this decision. 186
B.

UNITED STATES V.

AT&T

In November 1974, the Department of Justice filed an antitrust
suit against AT&T in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. The Department of Justice alleged that AT&T used its
position of dominance in the telecommunication industry to suppress new competition and that it maintained and enhanced its monopoly in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 187 The
Department of Justice sought divestiture of (1) Western Electric;
(2) Bell Labs; (3) the Long Lines Division; and (4) some or all of the
Bell Operating Companies (BOCs).188 After divestiture, AT&T
would no longer be a vertically integrated firm, nor would AT&T be
able to offer end-to-end telecommunications services.
In 1978, after appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties finally
began exchanging documents. After three years of discovery and almost a year of stipulation negotiations, there appeared to be an eleventh hour settlement in January 1981.189 The parties, however, were
not able to reach a settlement, and in March 1981, trial began. In
June 1981, the Department of Justice ended its case in chief, and in
August 1981, after AT&T's motion for summary judgment was denied, AT&T began the presentation of its case.
1. Reopening of the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree
In January 1956, the Department of Justice and AT&T had entered into a consent decree in which AT&T agreed not to engage in
"any business other than the furnishing of common carrier communications services."' 90 In March 1981, AT&T fied a motion with the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (Judge
and services offered by ITT, if competitively priced, over a ten year period. A deposit
of two hundred million dollars was required of AT&T which is returned to AT&T at
the rate of 10% of any AT&T purchases. The remaining balance would be returned in
either 1990 or 1995 pursuant to the detailed terms of the agreement. The two billion
dollars of purchases by AT&T from ITT over ten years represent less than 2% of
Western Electric's annual sales to the Bell System over the ten year period.
186. See ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (June 19, 1980).
187. See Department of Justice, Plaintiff's First Statement of Contention and
Proof-U.S. v. AT&T, Western Electric Corp., Inc., and Bell Laboratories Inc. 3 (1974).
188. Id. at 527. Specifically, the Department of Justice seeks
the separation of AT&T's ownership of intercity facilities from its ownership
of local facilities and the separation of the current providers of telecommunications services from the manufacturer of telecommunications equipment
and its allied research and development facilities.
189. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-15 (Jan. 22, 1981).
190. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 1956 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 68,246 (Part
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Victor Biunno presiding) seeking a construction of the 1956 Western
Electric Consent Decree which would not bar AT&T from "furnishing
[or manufacturing equipment and facilities in connection with providing] 'customer premises equipment' and 'enhanced services'" as
defined by the FCC in its Computer Inquiry 11.191 The FCC believed
that detariffing, rather than deregulating, enhanced services and
CPE would permit AT&T, pursuant to the terms of the 1956 Western
Electric Consent Decree, to offer these services and products
through a separate subsidiary.1 92 Various motions were filed by the
parties, and amicus curiae briefs by non-parties. AT&T asked for an
expedited hearing of its motion which the Department of Justice opposed. Judge Biunno then ruled that the FCC decision in Computer
Inquiry II and the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree were not in
conflict with each other, and the Department of Justice filed an
appeal.
In January 1982, Assistant Attorney General William Baxter
submitted to Judge Biunno a proposal for the modification of the
1956 Western Electric Consent Decree. Judge Biunno accepted Baxter's proposal, and transferred supervision of the Consent Decree to
the federal district court in Washington, D.C., for consolidation with
the AT&T antitrust case already underway in that court (Judge Harold Greene presiding). 193 Baxter's proposed modifications were
placed before the district court in the form of a stipulation for voluntary dismissal between the parties.
2. The Proposed Decree
The proposed modifications to the 1956 Decree, hereinafter referred to as the Proposed Decree, would have eliminated all provisions of the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree and replaced them
with provisions which would have required AT&T to divest itself of
its twenty-two operating companies (BOCs) "by means of a spin-off
of stock of the separated BOCs to shareholders of AT&T, or by other
V). See 2 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 295
(1971).
191. Notice of Motion and Motion for Construction of Judgment of January 24,
1956, United States v. Western Elec. Inc. (filed March 4, 1981, by AT&T).
192. The National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA), part
of the Department of Commerce, is the principal advisor on telecommunications policy to the President, and it is charged with the responsibility of insuring that the
views of the Executive Branch are effectively presented to the FCC. The NTIA responded to the Petitionfor Reconsideration of the Second Computer Inquiry, by supporting the FCC in its construction of the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree. See
The National Telecommunications and Information Administration Petition for Reconstruction of the Second Computer Inquiry, 43 Fed. Reg. 24,348 (1978).
193. ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 82, 110 (Jan. 14, 1982).

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IV

disposition."' 194 These divested BOCs would assume control of the
intrastate localized exchange systems, while AT&T retained ownership and control over its Long Lines Division, Western Electric, and
Bell Laboratories. AT&T would also have been permitted to provide
customer premises equipment (CPE). AT&T was given eighteen
months for internal reorganization, after which the divestiture of the
local operating companies would take place. AT&T's plan for this reorganization was to be submitted to the Department of Justice
within six months after the effective date of the Final Decree.
The Proposed Decree would have required the divested companies to provide access to all intercity carriers on an equal basis with
that afforded AT&T. 195 The operating companies were also required
not to discriminate against AT&T's competitors when procuring or
interconnecting equipment or services; 196 when establishing or disclosing technical specifications; 197 or when planning new facilities or
services. 198 After divestiture, the BOCs would be required to provide, through a centralized organization, a single point of contact for
coordination of all operating companies in order to meet the requirements of national security and emergency preparedness. 99
The divested BOCs would have been allowed to provide only
exchange and exchange access services, 2° ° and other natural monopoly services that were regulated by tariff. This would have precluded the BOCs from offering any form of interchange services,
information services, or CPE.2° 1 These markets were left to AT&T to
pursue. The BOCs were permitted to provide directory services
(within the definition of "exchange access"), 20 2 but this provision
was generally interpreted as "White Pages" services rather than the
lucrative "Yellow Pages" services which were left in the control of
20 3
AT&T.
After divestiture of the BOCs, AT&T, within the Proposed Decree, would no longer be precluded (as it was in the 1956 Western
Electric Consent Decree) from entering any sort of business it might
194. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division-United States v. Western Electric;
Proposed Modification of Final Judgment; United States v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.; Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, 47 Fed. Reg. 4166 (1982).
195. Id. at 4167.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 47 Fed. Reg. at 4167-68 (Decree, sec. H(D)).
201. Id. at 4168 (Decree, sec. II(D)(1)(2)).
202. Id.
203. L GLASSER, AT&T SETTLEMENT: TERMs, EFFECTS, PROSPECTS 346-47 (1982).
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choose. 2° 4 Antitrust prohibitions against ownership by AT&T of
cable television, broadcast, electronic news, or other mass media
were reduced to normal antitrust criteria, rather than the antitrust
restrictions imposed by the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree.
Within six months after the entry of the Final Decree, the plan
for divestiture of the BOCs was to be submitted to the Justice Department for approval. The completion of the divestiture had to oc2
cur within eighteen months after the entry of the Final Decree. 05
Under this plan, the BOCs had to be provided with whatever facilities, personnel, systems, and rights to technical information which
would be necessary to provide all intercity carriers with equal access to interexchange facilities. 20 6 Although AT&T and the various
BOCs could not share ownership, personnel, facilities, or accounting
records, joint ownership of multifunction facilities as among the
BOCs could occur via lease or other arrangements if each BOC
maintained control over its own exchange telecommunications and
20 7
its exchange access functions.
Under the Proposed Decree, all supply and license contracts between the BOCs and AT&T's remaining subsidiaries would have
been terminated. 20 8 The BOCs would have retained priority status
in all dealings with AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell Laboratories
until September 1, 1987. This priority status was to enable the
BOCs to fulfill the requirements of the proposed Proposed Decree
development, manufacturin continuing, at the BOC level, research,
20 9
ing, and other support services.
Once separated from AT&T, the twenty-two BOCs would not
have been restricted in consolidating into one national or several regional companies. 210 The BOCs, whatever their final configuration,
could share costs to support a centralized organization for engineering, administration, and other services in order to insure a viable national communications network. 2 11 The BOCs could not
discriminate between AT&T and other interexchange carrier when
offering or procuring products or services. The BOCs would have
been required to provide equal services at equal tariffs to all inter204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
BOCs.
211.

Id. at 347.
47 Fed. Reg. 4167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Given later developments, in all likelihood there will be seven regional
Id.
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exchange carriers. 212 Although all exchange access rates were to be
cost based,2 13 the BOCs could seek court relief from this requirement when equal access was not possible (this relief from the requirement for equal charges is found in Appendix B to the Proposed
Decree).214 Where access by an interexchange carrier was not
equal, the BOCs could offer a lower charge to a carrier requiring
215
less exchange access.
The Proposed Decree did not specify whether regulation of these
requirements was to be left to the'FCC or to the state utilities commissions. Assistant Attorney General Baxter has claimed that it is
his understanding that BOC tariffs are within the jurisdiction of the
216
FCC under the Communication Act.
3. Problems of the Proposed Decree
a. Language Ambiguities
The Proposed Decree introduced new terminology without providing specific definitions of all terms. The BOCs were permitted to
provide "exchange telecommunications" and "exchange access."
AT&T was permitted to offer "interexchange communications" and
"customer premises equipment" (CPE). There was no clear delineation between the realms of "exchange" and "interexchange"
telecommunications. It was also within the realm of AT&T or part of
the amorphous "exchange telecommunications" reserved for the
BOCs.
b. The Divestiture Plan
Six months after the settlement was final, AT&T was permitted
to formulate a divestiture plan. This provision would have permitted AT&T unilaterally to decide how the divestiture would proceed,
thereby precluding control or review by Judge Greene. The critics
of this arrangement feared that AT&T would intentionally structure
the divestiture so as to insure the continued weakness of the BOCs
as independent companies. Competitors of AT&T requested that
Judge Greene withhold final approval of the settlement until after
the divestiture plan was finalized. AT&T argued that the Justice Department would have final approval of the divestiture, and that
AT&T's obligation to its shareholders ensured a fair division of assets because the shareholders of AT&T would also be shareholders
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id. at 4170.
Id.
Id.
L GLASSER, supra note 203, at 350.

19831

COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT

in the new companies.

2 17

c. The Long-Term Viability of the BOCs
There has been concern as to how financially viable the BOCs
will be once they are separated from AT&T. One technique to ensure the viability of the BOCs is to increase the access charge which
the interexchange carriers incur in order to interconnect with the local exchanges. 2 18 Further technological advances, however, may
preclude the need for these carriers to connect with the BOCs.
AT&T's Chairman Brown has already warned that if local telephone
companies attempt to charge AT&T "unreasonable" interconnect
fees, AT&T would emply these technological alternatives to bypass
2 19
the local networks.
AT&T's and Assistant Attorney General Baxter's initial proposals for the removal of "Yellow Pages" advertising, terminal equipment rentals, and intrastate toll services from the BOCs would have
effectively denied the BOCs access to traditional sources of revenue.2 20 Confining the BOCs to local telephone services could effectively condemn them to financial ruin within a few years since
technological advancements may make their present services unnecessary. 22 1 Without the opportunity to expand or augment services, the BOCs might be faced with severe financial difficulties.
d. Potential For Higher Local Telephone Rates
The loss of the terminal equipment rental market and "Yellow
Pages" advertising revenues, 222 and the loss of long distance subsidies, 223 may force the BOCs to increase local telephone rates as
much as 46% to maintain current revenue levels.224 AT&T may also
be permitted to bypass local exchanges and thereby deal directly
with portions of the local services market, which would siphon off a
very profitable portion of the BOCs market revenues.
e. The Nationwide Telecommunications Network
There may be a need for legislation to ensure cooperation and
217. THE Scor REPORT, April 1982, at 11-12.
218. See Pearee & Verveer, Some Policy-oriented Reflections on the AT&T Antitrust
Settlement, 29 FED. B. NEWS & J. 372, 373-74 (1982).
219. See Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1982, at 2.
220. THE Scorr REPORT, supra note 217, at 13.
221. See Katsh & Barney, The Proposed AT&T Consent Decree: A Preliminary
Analysis, 9 MEDIA L. NOTES 2 (1982).
222. See L GLASSER, supra note 203, at 19.
223. THE Scorr REPORT, supra note 217, at 14.
224. See Chavez, Rise in Local Rates May Come Rapidly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1982,
at 36.
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reduction of interconnection problems between interexchange carriers and the BOCs. Under the proposed settlement, the BOC's, left
with the local exchanges would be under state as well as federal
regulation. 225 Inconsistencies in regulation may develop between
226
the local exchange carriers and the Long Lines facilities.
f. Regulation of BOCs and Independent Telephone
Companies
Given the new economic and regulatory environment, the question arises as to whether continued regulation of the independent
phone companies and the BOCs would promote the expansion of
the telecommunications industry. Some industry observers feel that
permitting competition among the independents and the various
BOCs would promote the expansion of the telecommunications industry. 227 Others feel that allowing expansion of BOC's into any
communications market would place too much power into the hands
228
of the BOCs.
g. Patent Licensing and Competitive Problems
The 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree required that all components manufactured by Western Electric have patents that were
automatically available to competing equipment manufacturers.
The proposed settlement contained no similar requirement. Consequently, AT&T would have been able to use the revenues obtained
from patent licensees to support research and development (R&D)
work. This would have led to additional patents for AT&T to use in
order to ensure its competitive advantages. AT&T currently holds
the patents for basic semiconductor and laser technologies which
will permit AT&T to extract large license fees (if it will even grant
licenses) for these patents. If AT&T chooses not to license its patents to competitors, these competitors may be precluded from producing equipment capable of connecting with the AT&T network.
h. Cross-subsidizationby AT&T of New Operations
If AT&T were permitted to move into unregulated markets, it
would surely be tempted to fund its new operations with the revenues from the Long Lines Division. Competitors in these unregulated markets may rightfully assert that, given this tremendous
financial base, AT&T's new operations would have an unfair advantage. Competitors have already strongly argued for the separation
225.
226.
227.
228.

See L. GLASSER, supra note 203 at 351.
THE Scowt REPORT, supra note 217, at 15. See 356 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4-5.
L. GLAssER, supra note 203, at 27.
THE Scor REPORT, supra note 217, at 16.
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of Western Electric and Bell Labs from AT&T. 229
i. Access to Technical Information by Competitors
The Proposed Decree would require the BOCs to share information regarding future equipment needs with all manufacturers, but it
would not place the same requirement on AT&T and Long Lines.
Frequently, two or more years of lead time is necessary to place
such equipment in service. If Western Electric was given advance
notice of equipment specifications, Western Electric would have an
unfair advantage over other manufacturers in the production and
sale of this equipment.
j.

AT&T's Possible Expansion into Electronic Publishing
and Cable Television
AT&T may, depending on the interpretation of the Proposed Decree, be permitted to enter the electronic publishing and cable television markets. Technically, the language of the Proposed Decree
would permit AT&T to expand its operations into these markets.
Numerous legislators and newspaper organizations oppose permitting AT&T to have access to the publishing market. 230 Some believe
that First Amendment issues may exist. Representative Tim Wirth
has stated: "The settlement fails to adequately safeguard against
the threat to information diversity from AT&T being permitted to engage in information publishing over its remaining monopoly transmission facilities . . .its long distance lines."'23 1 AT&T has denied
its ability to monopolize these markets, claiming that divestiture
will eliminate this possibility. 232 The 1956 Western Electric Consent
Decree prohibited AT&T from owning cable television facilities in areas that it serviced. Since AT&T will no longer own local telephone
services, this prohibition no longer applies.
4. FCC Perspective on the Proposed Decree
The FCC reviewed the Proposed Decree and concluded that
there were three major areas of concern. 233 First, the BOCs exchange areas would each be limited to individual states, unless
Judge Greene permitted an exchange area to cross over into an ad229. Id. at 17.
230. Id. at 18.
231. See L Schwartz, Stacked Competition and Phony Regulations for AT&T: The
Proposed "Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981 (Dec. 1981)
(preliminary draft of as yet unpublished manuscript).
232. THE Scorr REPORT, supra note 217, at 18.
233. FCC Analysis of AT&T Antitrust Consent Decree (1981), reprinted in L. GLAsSER, supra note 203, at 344-62 [hereinafter cited as FCC Analysis].
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joining state. 23 In theory, then, one could argue that each of the
seven BOCs is merely a holding company for groups of state-oriented local exchange areas, with state public utilities commissions
exercising exclusive authority over each exchange area. If each exchange area were under the regulation of an individual state's public utilities commission, then the FCC would have no jurisdiction
over either the individual exchange areas or over the seven BOCs.
The position of the FCC is that it has authority over the seven
BOCs, based on the FCC's continued "superintendency of the na235
tional phone network."
Second, the FCC has also voiced concern about the structure
and pricing levels for access charges into the local exchange areas.236 Judge Greene, the FCC, and state public utilities commis-

sions could all, in theory, attempt to enforce their individual views
on proper access tariffs. The FCC has stated that it alone has authority to regulate these tariffs. As the BOCs file tariffs, the role of
the FCC in setting access tariffs will continually evolve. 237 Given
the new structure of the communications industry under the Proposed Decree, the FCC will also need to modify its "separation, accounting, and depreciation policies. 2 3 8
Third, the FCC is also concerned about timing issues between
various dates set in Computer Inquiry II and dates discussed in the
proposed United States v. AT&T settlement. Such timing issues will
require a great deal of attention to prevent different dates for similar
changes being enforced by the FCC and by Judge Greene. 239 The
FCC has stated that it would be helpful if Judge Greene would include a "Terminal Railway" clause in the final decree to ensure that
interpretations by AT&T and the BOCs of the decree are subject to
lawful agency orders issued by the FCC. 2 4 0 The FCC has stated that
234. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Proposed Modification of Final Judgment;
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal, 47 Fed.
Reg. 4166, 4169 (1982).
235. FCC Analysis, supra note 233, at 351.
236. Id.
237. See Procedures for Implementing the Detariffing of Customer Premises
Equipment and Enhanced Services, 89 F.C.C.2d 694, 699 (1982).
238. FCC Analysis, supra note 233, at 351.
239. Id. at 352.
240. Id. at 373. The "Terminal Railroad" clause concept is taken from Terminal
R.R. Ass'n v. United States, 266 U.S. 17 (1924). Paragraph 6 of the decree stated that:
Nothing in this decree shall be taken to affect in any wise or at any time the
power of the Interstate Commerce Commission over the rates to be charged
by the Terminal Railroad Association, or the mode of billing traffic passing
over its lines, or the establishing of joint through rates or routes over its
lines, or any other power conferred by law upon such commission.
Id. at 25.
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Computer Inquiry II and as many as twelve of its ongoing proceed24
ings are "substantially affected" by the proposed settlement. '
5. Congress and the Proposed Decree
a. H.R. 5158
The most recent form of H.R. 5158 represented an attempt by
the House Telecommunication Subcommittee to deal with the alleged deficiencies of the modification of the 1956 Consent Decree
contained in the proposed United States v. AT&T settlement.
Unlike the proposed settlement, H.R. 5158 would have provided
that Yellow Pages advertising remain with the BOCs because such
listings are a natural function of the local companies and would provide them with revenue to keep local phone rates low. 242 The Yellow
Pages produce an annual national revenue of approximately $2 billion. Pay telephone operations and maintenance would also have
241. FCC Analysis, supra note 233, at 356. A complete checklist of the impact of
the Consent Decree on major FCC matters follows (see below for explanation of

table):
CC Docket No. 78-72 (Access Charges)
ENFIA III
BSOC Tariffs Nos. 9 & 10
CC Docket No. 80-286 (Joint Board)
Docket No. 20828 (Computer II)
CBI-SNET Reconsideration
Docket No. 20188 (Depreciation/ELG)
CC Docket No. 78-196 (USDA)
CC Docket No. 79-105 (Station Connections)
CC Docket No. 79-318 (Cellular)
CC Docket No. 80-742 (License Contracts)
CC Docket No. 80-53 (Procurement)
WPC-3071 (Fiber Optics Filing)
Rate of Return Regulation
CC Docket No. 79-187 (1978 Earnings)
CC Docket No. 79-245 (Cost Manual)
Interstate Service Tariffs
CC Docket No. 79-252 (Competitive Carrier)
CC Docket No. 78-72 (Alaskan Entry)
CC Docket No. 81-2126 (Registration)
NTIA Joint Planning/Ownership Petition
CC Docket No. 80-634 (Comsat)
CC Docket No. 80-176 (International Resale)
CC Docket No. 80-632 (TAT-4)
Cable TV Cross Ownership

S P
S P
S P
P
S P
S P
P
P
P
P
S P
S P
U
U
U
U
U
U
S
S
S
S
S
S

S-Substantively Affected (i.e., new policies may be
necessary),
P-Procedurally Affected (i.e., new mechanisms may be
needed to achieve established policy goals)
U--Generally unaffected.
242. House Panel Approves Bill Adding New Limits to AT&T, CONG. Q., March 27,
1982, at 688.
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remained with the local operating companies. As with the provision
for Yellow Pages, this would have given the local companies more
revenue and ameliorated their need to charge higher local rates. All
installed terminal equipment would have remained with the BOCs,
and it would have continued to be provided under tariff until fully
depreciated. After five years, the operating companies would have
been permitted to sell, but not to manufacture, new terminal equipment, including computers, through separate subsidiaries. The bill
would have provided protection for employees' rights and benefits
during the transition period to deregulation (labor protection provisions would have been extended to all carriers which were permitted to establish a separate entity). AT&T would have been
prohibited from setting up its own information services and offering
these services over company phone lines. This provision, lacking in
the proposed settlement, had been sought by newspaper publishers
and others who viewed AT&T's ability to provide such services as
anticompetitive.
b. Reaction to H.R. 5158
The Wirth bill, which attempted to deal with what was viewed
as deficiencies in the proposed settlement, was met by strong opposition from AT&T. According to AT&T, the bill would have disrupted
the nation's phone system by placing undue burdens on long distance lines. Congressman Wirth contended that committee members were sympathetic to AT&T and that they caused procedural
delays which included forcing the reading of the 130 page bill line by
line and demanding extensive debate on each amendment. 243 As a
result of these efforts by the opponents of H.R. 5158, Wirth, in a surprise move, withdrew his bill from consideration and claimed that
AT&T had waged a campaign of "fear and distortion," and that
"[t]he only way to pass legislation [in the time remaining] would be
' '2
to accept an agreement dictated by AT&T. 4
6. Modifications of the Proposed Decree by Judge Greene
Judge Greene insisted in his August 1982, opinion that the proposed settlement plan be modified in several critical areas. These
areas addressed many of the concerns found in the Packwood and
Wirth bills. Congressman Wirth praised Greene's opinion as a positive first step, yet he cautioned that Congressional action was still
243. See Supporters of AT&T Bill Block Major Change, CONG. Q., July 17, 1982, at
1696.
244. See AT&T Bill Dropped, Killing Rewrite Efforts, CONG. Q., July 24, 1982, at
1773.
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245
needed to establish a comprehensive telecommunications policy.
Although Judge Greene recognized that he had no power to order changes to the Consent Decree, he was able to insist on modifications to the settlement agreement by threatening the parties with a
resumption of the trial if they did not agree to his modifications
(Judge Greene gave the parties fifteen days to consider whether
they would accept his modifications). 24 Because Judge Greene's
opinion contained several statements indicating that there was sufficient evidence to support the government's position, AT&T, faced
with Judge Greene's ultimatum and recognizing the very real possibility that it could lose the case on the merits if the trial were to be
247
resumed, agreed to his modifications.
Judge Greene set forth ten modifications to the order, four of
which constitute major changes to the proposed Consent Decree248:
1. AT&T is to be barred for seven years from "electronic publishing" activities using its own transmission lines (this prohibition
would not include the offering of directory or time/weather services). Judge Greene noted the potential for AT&T to discriminate
against competitors and to deter potential competitors, although he
also noted that AT&T, at the present time, had no plans to enter this
249

field;

2. Divestiture, the keystone of the settlement, was considered
by Judge Greene to be an appropriate remedy, and he noted that
the charges that AT&T may have monopolized the intercity communications and telecommunications product market "may be well
taken. '250 As part of this divestiture, the BOCs would be given
the following powers:
a. to provide but not to manufacture, customer premises equipment (CPE);
b. to publish the Yellow Pages (AT&T must personnel, systems,
and rights to the information are necessary to produce the advertising directories); and
c. to request the court to remove the restrictions on the local 25com1
panies from providing long distance service and maintenance;
3. The local companies are to have debt ratios of approxi245. Courts AT&T Ruling Refocuses Attention on New Legislation, CONG. Q., Aug.
14, 1982, at 1986.
246. Judge's Power in Settlements Outlined in AT&T Decision, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 23,
1982, at 3.
247. Id.
248. ANTIRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 317 (Aug. 12, 1982).
249. Id. at 318.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 317.
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mately 45%, and the quality of the debt is to be equal to that of
AT&T;
4. The local companies' billing services must indicate to customers that they may choose an independent carrier for long distance service. These carriers must be given the same access as
AT&T receives, or in the alternative, price discounts. Finally, the order reserves the court's jurisdiction to insure that the purposes of
of a
the Decree are carried out, and it prohibits the implementation
252
reorganization plan without the court's approval.
Judge Greene supported the removal of the restrictions imposed
on AT&T by the 1956 Western Electric Consent Decree, finding that
AT&T's monopoly power had its root in AT&T's control of the local
operating companies, and "with the divestiture of these local exare not required unless
change monopolies, continued restrictions
'253
justified by some other rationale.
In late August 1982, the Justice Department sent Judge Greene
a proposed order incorporating all of his conditions. 25 4 The Justice
Department had feared that the local companies would monopolize
the selling of complex exchange equipment used by businesses.
But Judge Greene rejected this position, noting that the remote pos[the
sibility of such monopolization was due to "the certainty that 255
local companies] would provide healthy competition for AT&T."
In October 1982, AT&T filed a four volume plan which laid out
25 6
the seven regions in which the local companies would operate.
The AT&T plan also outlines Local Access and Transport Areas
(LATA's) within which the local companies will provide services.
Other carriers will be allowed to provide long distance service linking the LATA's. The filing of this plan by AT&T was the first major
step in the divestiture which is to be concluded by February 24,
1984.257
VII.

A COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PROPOSALS FOR
RESTRUCTURING AT&T

Although not complete in every detail, Table I sets forth a comparison of major provisions of Computer Inquiry II, the United
States v. AT&T Consent Decree (the "Proposed Decree"), the Wirth
Bill (H.R. 5158), and the Packwood Bill (S. 898).
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id. at 318.
ANITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 381 (Aug. 26, 1982).
Id.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1982, § D, at 1, col. 6.
Id.
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Table I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PROPOSALS FOR
RESTRUCTURING AT&T
COMPARISON OF PROPOSALS

CRITICAL QUESTION

Computer
Inquiry II

1982
Consent

Wirth Bill

Packwood
Bill

1. What will be the
role of market competition?

CPE &
Enhanced
Services

AT&T
Deregulated

AT&T
Partially
Deregulated

AT&T
Deregulated

2. Who will own Bell
Labs?

AT&T

AT&T

Initially
separate
company

AT&T

3.

Who will own the
Bell Operating
Companies?

AT&T

Separate
companies

Initially
separate
companies

AT&T

4.

Who will own Western Electric?

AT&T

AT&T

Initially
separate
company

AT&T

5. Who will own Long
Lines?

AT&T

AT&T Partially
separate
subsidiary

AT&T

AT&T

6. Who will own Yellow Pages?

AT&T

BOCs

AT&T

AT&T

7. Who will control
the pay telephones?

AT&T

BOCs

AT&T

AT&T

8. What will be the
role of the FCC?

Continued
active

Many
questionable
areas

Active
regulator

Active
regulator

9. What will the states
be able to do?

Lesser
role as
CPE is
deregulated

Active in
exchange
areas in
access
charges

Active at
state
level

Active

AT&T left
intact

Neutral

Statutory
protections

Neutral

10.

How will the employees be protected?
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11.

How will the stockholders be protected?

AT&T still
dominant

AT&T
Must set
up BOCs
as
financially viable

12. How will equipment be transferred
upon divestiture?

FCC will
need to
interface
Computer
Inquiry
11

Yes

13.

Who will be able to
sell customer
equipment?

AT&T
separate
subsidiary

14.

Where will research and development take place?

15.

What will happen
to existing Bell Lab
patents?

16.

What will be the
BOCs'
responsibilities?

17.

What will happen
to the AT&T/BOC
license agreements

Will
remain

18.

Will
telecommunications
carriers be required
to interconnect?

19.

Will AT&T be allowed to go into data processing?

20.

Will any safeguards
against price discrimination be established?

21.
22.

[Vol. IV

Neutral

Neutral

AT&T not
BOCs

AT&T
separate
subsidiary

AT&T
separate
subsidiary

Bell Labs

Bell Labs
& BOCs

Bell Labs

Bell Labs

AT&T will
keep
them

AT&T will
keep
them

Open to
public
license

AT&T will
keep
them

Leased

Revised

Revised

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

In a separate
subsidiary
FCC will
monitor

Yes

In a separate
subsidiary
FCC will
monitor

In a separate
subsidiary
FCC will
monitor

How will the public
be protected?

FCC

FCC &
court

FCC

FCC

Will
telecommunications
carriers be allowed
pricing flexibility?

Some

Yes

Yes

Yes

Manage
local
exchange
areas

Court &
FCC will
monitor
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VIII.

COMMUNICATIONS ENVIRONMENT
FUTURE TRENDS IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS
INDUSTRY

A.

EMERGING LEGAL STRUCTURE

In his historical analysis of AT&T's development and growth,
Gerald Brock reviewed the numerous strategic decisions made by
AT&T's management throughout AT&T's existence. 258 One such decision was AT&T's acceptance of the 1913 "Kingsberry Commitment"
in which AT&T agreed not to continue its attempt to take over the
telecommunications industry; as a result, the competition between
AT&T and the independent telephone companies was greatly
259
reduced.
Given a history of strategic decisions by AT&T's management, it
is not surprising that, during deliberations with Congress and the
FCC over the future structure of AT&T, AT&T was not only willing to
accept a separate subsidiary as part of the revised structure of
AT&T; it also proposed procedures to establish the separate subsidiary and began to create a separate AT&T subsidiary. 260 AT&T
agreed with Assistant Attorney General Baxter to spin off the BOCs,
thereby retaining Western Electric, Bell Labs, Long Lines, and Bell
headquarters instead of risking an unfavorable ruling in the United
States v. AT&T2 61 antitrust litigation.
Initially, the AT&T separate subsidiary, under Computer Inquiry
1I and both the Packwood and Wirth bills, would have been the deregulated portion of AT&T, while AT&T would have remained subject
to FCC and state public utility commission regulation. After the
United States v. AT&T Proposed Decree,262 however, the AT&T parent companies (Bell headquarters, Western Electric, Bell Labs, and
the portion of Long Lines offering enhanced services pursuant to
Computer Inquiry 11) will be deregulated, while the portion of Long
Lines offering basic services (and enhanced services until the procedures established under Computer Inquiry II have been fully implemented) will be regulated. Thus, the future legal structure of AT&T
will reflect AT&T's status as a substantially unregulated corporation.
As the FCC continues its deregulation of the telecommunications in258. G. BROCK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (1981).

259. Id. at 155-58. In more detail, under the 1913 "Kingsberry Commitment," AT&T
unilaterally agreed to dispose of its Western Union stock, to allow interconnection
with competing independents, and to refrain from further purchases of competitors in
return for the U.S. Attorney General's decision not to pursue antitrust litigation
against AT&T and the Bell System.
260. Copithorne, Key Word at AT&T is "Bus," 26 DATAMATION, May 1980, at 64.
261. See supra notes 186-257 and accompanying text.
262. Id.; 47 Fed. Reg. 4166 (1982).
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dustry under Computer Inquiry II, the size of the AT&T separate
regulated subsidiary will gradually decrease.
The two-part legal structure imposed upon AT&T must be extremely flexible to encourage advancement in communications technology, but it must be rigid enough to prevent cross-subsidization
from regulated to nonregulated affiliates. Cross-subsidization would
harm monopoly rate payers and unfairly enhance the competitive
position of the unregulated separate subsidiary.
In addition to the FCC's regulation of basic services and deregulation of enhanced services pursuant to Computer Inquiry II, the
FCC will remain active in the regulatory arena through its proceeding to revise the Uniform System of Accounts (USOA), its proceeding involving the Manual and Procedures for the Allocation of Costs,
and its administration of access charges for the local exchange areas. The FCC will continue to exercise overall supervision of the national telecommunication network, as well as numerous other
related communications areas. Given this pervasive enforcement of
the nation's communications policy, the FCC will undoubtedly continue to play a major role in regulating the seven regional BOCs, despite the fact that practically all local exchange areas will be within
individual states. Customer premises equipment (CPE) will be deregulated, and AT&T will be allowed to offer CPE. The BOCs will be
able to offer CPE under tariff only where unregulated CPE providers are unwilling to provide CPE (e.g., in isolated or unprofitable
areas) .263

B.

EMERGING COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES

The 1980's will witness an enormous growth in the information
industry because the capabilities for gathering, manipulating, and
disseminating information are based on advancing computer and
communications technologies which comprise many different technologies including, but not limited to, satellites, fiber optics, cellular,
Digital Electronic Message Service (DEMS), teletext (over-the-air
one way transmission of material such as airline schedules and
stock market news), and videotexts (involving two-way communication such as CATV).264 Communications technology will continually
increase the capability of carrying larger amounts of data at greater
263. For example, in remote rural areas, where there is limited demand for CPE, it
may not be profitable to offer CPE, and thus the BOC's may need to offer CPE on a
tariff basis.
264. See Micro Electronics: A Survey, THE ECONOMIST, March 11, 1980, at 3; Noyce,
Microelectronics, Sci. Am., Sept. 1977, at 63, 68.
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speeds and with lower unit costs. 265 All of these technologies require a flexible and fair legal structure if they are to develop to their
fullest potential.26 6 As these technologies develop further, they will
have a dramatic impact on the legal and regulatory structure and
environment of the telecommunications industry. The BOC legal
structure, for example, is premised on the continued technological
and economic viability of the local exchange areas. AT&T, however,
has stated that if access charges into local exchange areas become
too high, AT&T will use technology presently available to bypass the
local exchange areas, and instead connect its Long Lines directly to
267
its customers.
C.

INTERMIX OF THE EXPECTED LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND FUTURE
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY

Given the emerging legal structure of deregulated inter-local exchange (i.e., between cities), communication and customer premises
equipment (CPE), and regulated intra-local exchange (i.e., intracity) communication, an ever increasing variety of communications technologies can be expected to appear in the communications
marketplace. Although AT&T and the BOC's will dominate their respective areas, numerous competitors offering new products and
services can be expected to enter, or even to create, new markets for
these goals and services. 268 A shake-out of these new competitors is
inevitable. 269 In addition, the effects of the asset division between
AT&T and the BOCs can be expected to continue well into the late
1980's, as will the effects of Computer Inquiry II.
CONCLUSION
Overall, the pace of change in the market for communications
technology can be expected to increase rapidly in the 1980's. The intermix of FCC and state public utility regulation, therefore, will
265. See Hindin, Large Scale Integration Latches on to the Phone System, ELECTROmcs, June 5, 1980, at 113. See also Branscomb, Computer Technology and the
Evolution of World Communications, 47 TELECOM. J. 206, 208 (1980).
266. See Hardman, A Primer on Cellular Mobile Telephone Systems, 29 FED. B.
NEWS & J. 385 (1982); Senter, Private, Intracity Data Communications Networks, 29
FED. B. NEWS J. 414 (1982); Pace, A Bold New Worldfor Video, N.Y. Times, April 14,
1982, at DI.
267. See Uttal, What's Aheadfor AT&T's Competitors, FORTUNE, Dec. 28, 1981, at 79.
268. See Telecommunications: Everybody's Favorite Growth Business-The Battle
For a Piece of The Action, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 11, 1982, at 60.
269. See Oren & Smith, CriticalMass and Tariff Structure In Electronics Markets,
12 BELL J. ECON. 467 (1981) (theoretical analysis of minimum size to offer successful
communications services).
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need to remain flexible in order to adapt to changing communications technologies and to changes in the economics of the communications marketplace.

